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Law in the Electronic Brothel: How




Since 1989, several interesting and innovative works have
probed the relationships among electronic media' and various
legal doctrines. 2 These works examine the past, the present,
and the possible future effects of modern media on the law.3
They attempt to explain the effects of modern media on the
law and society. As such, they are both legal scholarship and
media ecology.4
More specifically, these works probe the relationships
among media, messages, society, and the law. In so doing, they
use several models to illuminate the ways in which changes in
communication technologies have changed society and its legal
* B.A., Metropolitan State College; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Puget
Sound School of Law.
1. For the purposes of this Comment, media are any technologies and models used
to convey messages.
2. The works are as follows: 1) Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First
Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 1087 (1990) [hereinafter
Collins & Skover, Paratroopers]; 2) M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELEcTRONIC MEDIA AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAw (1989); 3) Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover,
Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Collins & Skover,
Paratexts]; 4) Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce and
Communications (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Puget Sound
Law Review).
3. For example, Professor Katsh notes that "social consciousness," or current
societal norms, is as determinative of the meaning of obscenity as is the law. KATSH,
supra note 2, at 181 & n.26 (citing 2 TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 71 (1970)). To the extent that social consciousness is
affected by modern media, the meaning of obscenity for society and the law will also
be affected by these media.
4. Media ecology is the study of the effects of media on individuals, institutions,
and society.
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systems. This Comment applies three of these models to the
legal doctrines addressing depictions of sex.5
The application of these models to obscenity doctrines in
general, and to the case of Skyywalker v. Navarro 6in particu-
lar, reveals the tentative status of current obscenity doctrine.
The doctrine fails to account for the pervasive effects of media
on society. This failure results in the inability of the doctrine
to provide a coherent basis for careful First Amendment analy-
sis. Consequently, the First Amendment is being debased: it is
becoming both ineffective in controlling depictions of sex and
also ineffective in controlling censorship. Thus, the models
reveal that the First Amendment is in danger of collapse.
5. In dealing with legal treatments of depictions of sex, virtually every pertinent
work struggles from the outset with such questions as What is "sexuality"? What is
"obscenity"? and What is "pornography"? Many works, particularly law review
articles, begin with a footnote containing OED-type definitions of one or more of these
terms. Others, notably book-length treatments such as Walter Kendrick's insightful
historical analysis of the development of "pornography," spend their entire contents
defining, or refusing to "merely" define, one or more of these terms. See WALTER
KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM-PORNOGRAPHY IN MODERN CULTURE (1987).
As both Kendrick and the 1986 Report of the Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography point out, to define a word like "pornography" at the beginning of an
attempt to understand that term's meaning is a mere exercise in question-begging. Id.
at 31; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 228 (1986)
[hereinafter 1986 FINAL REPORT]. It is question-begging because such terms "name an
argument, not a thing." KENDRICK at 31. As Kendrick also points out, however, the
1986 FINAL REPORT, despite its apparent condemnation of such circular exercises,
nevertheless jumps on the definitional merry-go-round by using the word
"pornography" on "virtually every one of its 2,000 pages." KENDRICK at 234-35.
This Comment will use phrases such as "depictions of sex" or "sexually explicit
depictions" to indicate representations, written or otherwise, of sexual acts. The
phrase is intended to recognize the fact of the depiction of sexual acts, rather than to
assert the relative value of such depictions. The term "obscenity" is used according to
its legal definition at the time it was applied to a given sexually explicit depiction by a
court.
The term "pornography" is eschewed because it appears to be the current
battleground whereon a struggle is being waged for the power to define the
"harmfulness" and relative worth or worthlessness of sexually explicit depictions. But
see GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY 20-
29 (1988) (critiquing several pornography commissions' word usage, including the
Meese Commission's. The authors nevertheless chose to use the word "pornography"
because it includes, by one definition, the intention to arouse sexual impulses in the
viewer.). But see infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of one
court's mistakes regarding the ability to incite sexual behavior.
This Comment argues that the combatants in this struggle are ignoring the effects
of the media that carry these depictions in determining the depiction's abilities to
harm and their relative worth. As a result, the combatants are merely begging
questions.
6. 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Skyywalker involved the rap group 2 Live
Crew's album, Nasty As They Wanna Be. The group sought injunctive relief and a
declaration that the album was not obscene. See infra note 142, et seq.
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One such model examines the historical relationships
between changes in media and changes in society and its legal
systems. Through such historical examinations, this model
attempts to account for previously unrecognized and unexam-
ined assumptions that may be sources of confusion in current
legal thinking.
Another model used by these works to examine the effects
of media on the law is the development of broad-based heuris-
tics. A heuristic is both a system for organizing thought and a
model for stimulating thought. The application of these mod-
els to current legal doctrine reveals discontinuities that may
have developed between legal theory and the real world. Such
discontinuities stem from a general failure to examine the
effects of media on the law itself. By clarifying the pervasive
ways that media affect legal doctrines, such heuristics may
help courts and scholars to develop legal theories that will
more accurately reflect the real world.
A third model for examining the relationships between
law and media applies specific media theories to the facts of a
case. This narrowly focused approach contrasts with and adds
to the broader heuristic approach described above. By specifi-
cally analyzing the effects of media in the context of particular
cases, this third model illuminates gaps in courts' reasoning
caused by their failure to understand media effects. By eluci-
dating these effects, this model may facilitate more careful
analyses by the courts.
Thus, this Comment seeks to examine the implications of
media ecology models for the past, present, and possible future
of obscenity doctrine.7 Section II of this Comment applies the
first model in examining the historical origins of obscenity doc-
trine in light of media ecology.8  This analysis of history
reveals a critical presupposition about the effects of media on
human behavior.
Since the Middle Ages, the ability of words to affect
7. Professors Collins and Skover have applied the concepts of media ecology to the
broader framework of the law. See Paratroopers and Paratexts, supra note 2. This
Comment may be viewed in part as both an introduction to the concepts contained in
their work and also as an application of their media theory framework to obscenity
doctrine.
8. Professor Katsh gives a concise analysis of the development of obscenity
doctrine in relation to developing media. KATSH, supra note 2, at 181-89. This
Comment will expand on Professor Katsh's work.
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human sexual conduct has been presupposed.' However, no
one has convincingly demonstrated a causal connection
between depictions of sex and sex crimes.10 The assertion of
such a connection may have developed as a result of the Catho-
lic Church's struggle to control the written word." In spite of
this lack of empirical evidence supporting a causal connection
between pictures of sex and sexual violence, courts have
adopted this presupposition wholesale.' Thus, courts are per-
petuating the presupposition as a legal presumption and,
thereby, perpetuating confusion in legal thinking about sexu-
ally explicit materials.
To say that the courts have adopted the Church's pre-
sumption wholesale is not, of course, to say that such adoption
is intrinsically "bad." However, the presumption fails to
explain why obscenity is "harmful" and "worthless."' 3 Seen in
the light of media ecology, the historical development of
obscenity doctrine'4 reveals that the absence of explanation
9. See infra text accompanying notes 28-72, and KENDRCK, supra note 5.
10. See EDWARD DONNERSTEIN ET AL., THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY 108-12
(1987) (while depictions of sex do not increase tendencies toward sexual
aggressiveness, unless such depictions also include violence, depictions of violence
alone may increase tendencies toward sexual aggressiveness). Compare, e.g., 1986
FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 317-19:
We recognize, therefore, that a positive correlation between pornography and
sex offense does not itself establish a causal connection between the two....
The plausibility of hypothesized independent variables causing both use of
pornography and sex offenses is one factor in determining the extent to which
causation can be suggested by correlational evidence.... [B]ut in no area has
this inference [causation from correlation] been strong enough to justify
reliance on correlational evidence standing alone.... [Therefore,] drawing
conclusions requires making assumptions.... Sometimes these assumptions
are justified, and sometimes they are not.
(emphasis added), with 1986 FINAL REPORT at 203-07 (dissenting member doubting the
efficacy of the social science materials cited in 1986 FINAL REPORT), and with PtimIP
NOBILE & Eruc NADLER, UNITED STATES OF AMEmCA V. SEX: How THE MEESE COM-
MISSION LIED ABOUT PORNOGRAPHY 351-53 (1986) (two researchers whose work was
relied on by the Commission stating "new and more sophisticated research [our's and
others'] reviewed by the Commission makes a causal connection between sexually
explicit materials and rape even less plausible than it was when the 1970 Commission
was examining this issue.").
11. See infra text accompanying notes 25-30. This struggle may have had its
origins in the Judeo-Christian traditions surrounding the control of pictorialism (such
as graven images) in the Middle Ages.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 38-72.
13. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SoCIETY 181 (1986) (arguing that
categorical exclusions of certain types of speech that do not require explanations by
the court fail to provide the necessary guidance to society).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 38-72.
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lies, at least partially, in the development of the media used to
carry such messages.
In Section III, this Comment next applies the second
model; the current test that courts use to determine whether
an expression is obscene is examined through two broad media
theory heuristics: the Paratroopers' Paradox 5 and the absorp-
tion theory.
1 6
This Comment also applies the third model; Section IV
examines media effects within the context of recent cases by
applying specific media ecology theories to those facts. This
application reveals the inability of current obscenity doctrine
to facilitate careful and insightful analyses. By failing to
account for the effects of media on the messages being ana-
lyzed, courts reach self-contradictory and untenable conclu-
sions. This application also demonstrates the benefits of a
careful examination of media effects within the context of
obscenity analysis. 7
II. THE HISTORY OF OBSCENITY LAW AND ITS RELATION TO
CHANGING MEDIA'
Sexually explicit works have existed in the Occident at
15. Collins & Skover, Paratroopers, supra note 2.
16. The absorption theory is based on Jean Baudrillard's theories of "implosion."
Those theories are developed in JEAN BAUDRILLARD, IN THE SHADOW OF THE SILENT
MAJORITIES (1983) [hereinafter, BAUDRILLARD, SHADOW]. For an explanation of
absorption theory, see infra text accompanying notes 93-114.
17. See infra text accompanying note 142, et seq. For an analysis of the effects of
postmodernist art on obscenity analysis, see Amy M. Adler, Note, Postmodern Art and
the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990). This Comment will reach a
substantially similar conclusion to that of Ms. Adler: that rational legal principles are
debased by postmodernist discourse involving new concepts of the limits of art and its
relation to depictions of sex acts. However, this Comment seeks to analyze the
broader effects of the media themselves, rather than specific uses of the media.
18. Many works have examined the history of the development of obscenity law.
This Comment draws largely on the following works: EDWARD DE GRAZIA,
CENSORSHIP LANDMARKS (1969); KATSH, supra note 2 at 181-89 (1989); LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 904-27 (2d ed. 1988); Karl A. Groskaufmanis,
Comment, What Films We May Watch: Videotape Distribution and the First
Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1236, 1265-72 (1988); Robert E. Riggs, Indecency on the
Cable. Can it be Regulated?, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 269, 279-87 (1984); William B. Lockhart,
Escape From the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L.
REV. 533, 537-46 (1975); Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of
First Amendment Protection, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3-22 (1974); William B.
Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 324-29 (1954); Susan G. Caughlan, Note, Private
Possession of Child Pornography: The Tensions Between Stanley v. Georgia and New
York v. Ferber, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187, 189-98 (1987).
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least since the Golden Age of Greece.' 9 However, common law
regulation of obscenity did not begin until the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries.20 As Justice Douglas repeat-
edly noted in dissent,2 ' obscenity in literature was considered a
matter for the ecclesiastical courts until the second half of the
nineteenth century.22
Prior to the development of the printing press in 1450,
"scarcity and obscurity provided all the necessary safeguards"
against widespread access to sexually explicit works.' The
few transcriptions of texts were written slowly and exclusively
by hand. Scribes were among the few who could read what
was written. Because they learned their skills from the only
school available, the Catholic Church, scribes rarely tran-
scribed anything sexually oriented.24 Thus, the Church effec-
tively maintained control over access to sexually explicit
materials.
As the print medium expanded, however, the leaders of
the fifteenth-century Catholic Church recognized that the
printed word presented a threat to the Church's control over
hearts and minds.2 Consequently, Church leaders perceived
any messages conveyed through this new medium as dangerous
to the extent that such messages threatened the Church's con-
trol.26 Sexually explicit messages, therefore, were specifically
regulated only to the extent that they were combined with
19. KATSH, supr note 2, at 181-82.
20. Id. at 183-85.
21. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 428-29 (1966); United States v. 12,200-
Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 135 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas'
point was that common law courts had absorbed the ecclesiastical courts' presumptions
regarding the harmfulness of depictions of sex acts, which were in turn largely based
on the moral presuppositions of St. Augustine regarding original sin. See generally
ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EvE, AND THE SERPENT (1988) (particularly ch. 5).
22. Memoirs, 383 U.S at 428-29. The origins of ecclesiastical censorship may
perhaps be traced to St. Paul's followers. For example, the following passage is found
in Acts: "Many of them also which used curious arts brought their books together, and
burned them before all men...." Acts 19:19 (King James).
23. KATSH, supra note 2, at 184 & n.39 (quoting KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM:
PORNOGRAPHY IN MODERN CULTURE 58 (1987)).
24. WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLoGIZING OF THE WORD
95 (1982). See also HAROLD INNIS, THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION 19 (1951). Professor
Innis' work was instrumental in the development of media ecology. Among others, it
strongly influenced media ecologist Marshall McLuhan. McLuhan examined the
transformation of human consciousness through alterations in communications
technologies from orality to scribality, to print and beyond. See, e.g., MARSHALL
McLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY (1962) [hereinafter McLUHAN, GALAXY].
25. KATSH, supra note 2, at 183-85.
26. Id.
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messages that were politically dangerous.27
Within one hundred years after the advent of the printing
press, the Church had determined that the printed word could
corrupt the morals of its followers and had begun to control
access to all types of printed works."' For example, in 1564,
the Council of Trent published Pope Paul IV's ten rules for
controlling literature in the Index of Forbidden Books; rule
number seven forbade obscene books that might corrupt
morals.29 The Church failed to enforce these rules, however,
perhaps because the Church was more interested in prohibit-
ing dissemination of vernacular bibles.'
Similarly, the mid-sixteenth-century English government
made no major attempts to control sexually explicit materials.
However, because the government, like the Church, recognized
the power of the word, it did manifest some desire to control
the word through licensing statutes. These statutes prohibited
plays that dealt with politics or religion in an unsatisfactory
manner. In addition, a historical inversion of censorial con-
cerns regarding political speech on the one hand, and obscene
speech on the other, began to develop around this time."' As
sexually explicit materials that had been reserved to the elite
literate class became more accessible, the government gradu-
ally began to regulate them.32
Well into the late seventeenth century, the government
asserted little control over sexually oriented materials and
simply allowed the English licensing acts to expire. In addi-
tion, writings like those of Locke and Spinoza, calling for reli-
gious toleration and for the separation of politics and religion,
began to influence political thought and institutions. Thus,
27. 1I
28. JOSHUA MEYROwrrz, No SENSE OF PLACE: THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA
ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 64 (1985) (citing S.H. STEINBERG, FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OF
PRINTING (1974)). Meyrowitz, a media ecologist working from the perspective of
sociology, argues that the Church's relative indifference to obscenity problems resulted
from a perception in the Church that obscenity control was of relatively little import
to maintenance of hegemony over individual morality. This fact will attain a certain
irony as control of sexually explicit materials attains greater importance in the
twentieth century. As will be shown, modern concerns over obscenity control are at
least partially based on assumptions made by the Church regarding the supposedly
powerful effect that depictions of sexuality have on morality. These assumptions were
never questioned by courts at common law.
29. 1&
30. Id.
31. KATSH, supra note 2, at 185.
32. Id
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until the eighteenth century, control of sexually explicit
materials remained with the religious institutions.
Although the term "obscene" was used in the context of
common law libel cases beginning in 1726,11 no definition of
the term was provided. Prosecutions were limited to cases of
libel, or "obscene libel," and to cases involving obscene conduct
in public places.3 Punishment for obscenity was thereby lim-
ited to attacks on others' reputations-reputations that could
only develop and spread in the context of the printed word.
In the late eighteenth century, an explosion of mass publi-
cation occurred as commercialism and commodification3 com-
bined with mass printing technologies.w Since that time, a
heated battle has raged in both religious and secular circles
concerning the widespread dispersion of sexually explicit
materials.
Nineteenth-century England saw the development of the
first secular and nongovernmental movements to suppress sex-
ually-oriented materials when concerned citizens formed the
"Society for the Suppression of Vice" in 1802, and Thomas
Bowdler published his "bowdlerized" version of Shakespeare
in 1818. This secularization of control over obscenity was a
response to the collapse of religious hegemony over moral
standards, partially brought about by the proliferation of
printed works accessible to the public. In response to these
political pressures, Parliament passed the Obscene Publica-
tions Bill in 1857, though the Bill left the term obscene
undefined.
In the late nineteenth century, the court in Regina v.
33. 1& at 183.
34. Id The Obscene Publications Act of 1857 used the term "obscene libel." 1857,
20 & 21 Vict. ch. 83 (Eng.). The purpose of the act was to make "obscene publication"
indictable. Id However, as might be expected, the Act gave no definition of
"obscene." Id
35. "Commodification" is the process by which materials change from unique or
limited production items into commodities that are reproduced on a mass scale.
36. INNIS, supra note 24, at 27, 29. While Professor Katsh does not directly discuss
the interplay between commodification and commercialization, Collins and Skover
place considerable emphasis on this causal nexus. Collins & Skover, Paratroopers,
supra note 2, at 1097-1107. See also Collins & Skover, Commerce and Communications,
supra note 2 (examination of dissonance between commercial speech theory and
realities of electronic advertising culture). Commodification and commercialization
are both seen as a result of the Industrial Revolution, which was in turn caused by the
development of print, among other factors, according to Innis, McLuhan, and others.
See, e.g., McLuHAN, GALAXY, supra note 24, at 269-72.
37. See infra note 41 (listing some of the works that detail the ongoing assault).
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Hicklin 8 stated a common law test for obscenity. The Hick-
lin court examined obscenity in terms of representations of
sexuality and their effects on the most susceptible persons that
might be exposed to such representations.3 9 Thus, any repre-
sentation of sexually-related matter that might corrupt chil-
dren or the "morally susceptible" could be suppressed under
the Hicklin test. The Hicklin test also allowed the courts to
find an entire work obscene based on any portion of the work,
rather than requiring examination of the work as a whole.'
Although it purported to create a legal standard of obscen-
ity, the Hicklin test merely absorbed the unexamined assump-
tion that written depictions of sexually-oriented subjects were
a corrupting influence. Thus, by 1868, the common law of Eng-
land had absorbed the censorial concerns about sexually
explicit speech. The shift from religious control of obscenity to
legal control was all but complete. Thus, the statutory and
common law of England had fully absorbed the assumptions
made under religious tenets regarding obscenity.
Since the mid-eighteenth century, censorial zeal regarding
sexually explicit material has greatly expanded, particularly in
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the advent of
electronic media.41 This increased fervor will be examined in
38. [1868] 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360. Hicklin involved a "respectable metal broker's"
possession and distribution of a work entitled "The Confessional Unmasked: Shewing
the Depravity of the Romish Priesthood, the Iniquity of the Confessional, and the
Questions Put to Females in Confession." Id at 362. Because it was destroyed, and the
court is silent on the point, no one knows what the document actually said, though the
court did say it contained "impure and filthy acts, words, and ideas." Id. at 363. These
are the words of the Obscene Publications Act as well.
39. Id at 368. The specific language of the court was "[w]hether the tendency of
the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open
to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."
I&
40. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 906. However, Professor Tribe acknowledges an
argument that Hicklin does not support an "isolated passages" test because one-half of
the work at issue was found obscene. I& at n.17 (citing Note, More Ado About Dirty
Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364, 1406 (1966)). The Hicklin court also noted that "[t]he mere
use of obscene words, or the occurrence of obscene passages, does not make the work
obscene"; otherwise, "the Venus in Dulwich Gallery," "Bayle's Dictionary," "Chaucer,"
"Byron," and "Milton's Paradise Lost and Regained" might all be considered
"obscene." Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 365.
41. KATSH, supra note 2 at 181-86. See generally, EDWARD DE GRAzIA, BANNED
FILMS: MovIEs, CENSORS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1982) (historical analysis of
film censorship); EDWARD DE GRAZIA, CENSORSHIP LANDMARKS, supra note 18
(extensive survey of important court cases involving censorship); ROBERT P. DOYLE,
BANNED BOOKS WEEK '90: CELEBRATING THE FREEDOM To READ; A RESOURCE BOOK
(1990) (citing hundreds of books recently banned or challenged); MICHAEL B.
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relationship to developments in United States law and changes
in modern media.
In the United States, the Hicklin test was widely adopted
by the courts.' The groundwork for this widespread accept-
ance had been laid by secular movements, similar to those in
England, organized to control the spread of sexually-oriented
materials. Anthony Comstock and other self-styled guardians
of public morality campaigned and lobbied for legislation to
restrict the flow of all sexually-related materials.43 These
activist groups were largely successful, spurring the enactment
of federal legislation criminalizing the mailing of obscene
materials (the so-called Comstock Act of 18734) and the adop-
tion of anti-obscenity statutes in several states.45
Although Judge Learned Hand recommended abandoning
the English Hicklin test as early as 1913,1 it was not until 1933
that American courts decisively rejected the test.47 Presiding
GOODMAN, CONTEMPORARY LITERARY CENSORSHIP: THE CASE HISTORY OF BURROUGHS'
NAKED LUNCH (1981) (interesting account of the various court challenges to gonzo
journalism's seminal text); ROBERT W. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA: PATTERNS
OF CENSORSHIP AND CONTROL (1974) (detailing the rise of the populist censorial
campaign).
42. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 906.
43. Id See generally, Lockhart & McLure, supra note 18, at 311-16.
44. Comstock Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 158, 17 Stat. 559 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1988)). The Comstock Act provided:
That no obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, print, or
other publication of an indecent character, or any article or thing designed or
intended for the prevention of conception or procuring of abortion, nor any
article or thing intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use or
nature, nor any written or printed card, circular, book, pamphlet,
advertisement or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly,
where, or how, or of whom, or by what means either of the things before
mentioned may be obtained or made, nor any letter upon the envelope of
which, or postal-card upon which indecent or scurrilous epithets may be
written or printed, shall be carried in the mail.
Cited in KENDRICK, supra note 5, at 134 (citing ANTHONY COMSTOCK, TRAPS FOR THE
YOUNG (Robert Bremmer ed., 1967)).
45. See generally, HANEY, supra note 41. In addition, local censorship boards,
which managed to prevent the dissemination of many works through threats of
boycotts and lawsuits, proliferated in the United States. Id.
46. See United States v. Dennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
47. By that point, such works as THEODORE DREISER, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY and
D. H. LAWRENCE, LADY CHATTERLY'S LOVER had been found to be obscene. See TRIBE,
supra note 18 at 906-07 (citing Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472
(1930) (AMERICAN TRAGEDY) and Commonwealth v. Delacey, 271 Mass. 327, 171 N.E.
455 (1930) (LADY CHATrERLY'S LOVER)). Interestingly, in England, Lawrence's THE
RAINBOW had been banned in 1915, and no attempt to publish LADY CHATTERLY'S
LOVER was made until 1959.
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at a trial involving James Joyce's Ulysses,' Judge Woolsey cre-
ated a new test and rejected Hicklin.49 Finding Ulysses not to
be obscene, Judge Woolsey suggested a new standard that mea-
sured the effect of the work on the "average person," rather
than Hicklin's "most susceptible person," and also examined
the work as a whole, rather than only the most questionable
portions, as Hicklin allowed.'
The rejection of the Hicklin test marked a substantial
improvement in the efficacy of obscenity examination. By
requiring consideration of the effects of the entire work, the
Ulysses test avoided banning works based on isolated passages
alone. This aspect of the Ulysses standard somewhat mitigated
the unfortunate wholesale adoption of the Hicklin assumption
that explicit depictions of sexuality are harmful to the average
reader. This continued assumption that sexually explicit
materials are harmful was unfortunate because, like any tacit
assumption in the law, it may create a perception that the law
in this area is unreasonable, arbitrary, and unprincipled. In
other words, by failing to explain how the depiction of sexually
explicit activity is harmful to the average reader, the court
appears to lack a rational foundation for its assertions.
Applying the new standard, Judge Woolsey noted the tre-
mendous creativity and essential integrity of Joyce's psychoan-
alytical or stream-of-consciousness approach in Ulysses. He
likened Joyce's technique to a "multiple exposure on a cinema
film," the parts of which could not be separated without mak-
ing a mockery of his "sincere" and "honest" artistry.5 Fur-
ther, Judge Woolsey speculated that Joyce's use of this
48. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
aff'd sub. nor. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934). ULYSSES is considered by many critics to be one of the great works
of literature produced in this century. It is an allegory about one day in the life of
Leopold Bloom and his friends and family in Dublin, Ireland. It is written in a stream
of consciousness format. No intimate thoughts that might conceivably come to mind in
the course of a day are omitted, including those of sex and excretion. The
intrusiveness of such depictions, combined with the obvious power of the narrative, led
many to seek to ban ULYSSES.
49. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
aff'd sub. nomn. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934). See also TRIBE, supra note 18, at 907.
50. Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. at 183-84. Indeed, with regard to examining the whole
work, Judge Woolsey also noted that many critical studies of ULYSSES had been
published. He even appeared to suggest that such in-depth analysis was the proper
approach because of the work's literary reputation. I& at 183.
51. Id.
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graphic-like technique may have been one source of the famed
obscurity of Ulysses because such rich and complex images are
difficult, if not impossible, to capture in print.52
Thus, in refusing to ban Ulysses on the basis of the "strong
draught"'53 of sexuality contained in some portions of the work,
Judge Woolsey implemented a holistic analysis of the effect of
the entire work. He analyzed the effect of the medium as a
whole, rather than destroying the integrity of the message by
separating it from its context. Judge Woolsey found the over-
all effect of the work to be "that of a somewhat tragic and very
powerful commentary on the inner lives of men and women,"
rather than that of an "aphrodisiac."' Courts quickly adopted
and applied the Ulysses formulation.
Then, in 1957, the Supreme Court addressed for the first
time whether the First Amendment's protection of speech and
the press should be extended to sexually explicit works. In
Roth v. United States,5 the Court applied a Ulysses-oriented
test: "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.' ' 6 Unfortu-
nately, the Court again carried forward the assumption that
obscenity, whatever it may be, is "utterly without redeeming
social importance. '5
7
Once again, the Court failed to examine the presumptions
underlying its assertion that depictions of sex are worthless.
52. Id. This is not the last time that written works will be analogized to film, nor
will such analogies always produce such happy consequences. See infra text
accompanying notes 204-12 (discussing the analogy as applied in Skyywalker v.
Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990)).
53. Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. at 185.
54. Id. The requirement of taking the work as a whole raises some interesting
definitional issues involving photographs and music. See infra text accompanying note
185.
55. 354 U.S. 476, rehg denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957).
56. Id at 489. In a companion case to Roth, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957),
the Court implicitly rejected Hicklin's susceptible persons test.
57. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. While the Court did not explain what it was finding
obscene or why, it did say that "sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene
material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."
Id at 487 (footnote omitted). "Prurient interest" was defined in a footnote as
"material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." Id at 487 n.20 (citing
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged, 2d ed. 1949)). While the
Court may have believed that this definition had some operative content, it is unclear
how such a broad definition could distinguish many of the sights and sounds of a large
American city from the material at hand. Once again, the circle was completed, the
question begged, and the presumption absorbed.
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This time, however, the Court's failure to examine this
assumption is particularly unfortunate because, given the
importance of the First Amendment to the Roth decision, the
appearance of irrational decision-making creates a new level of
danger for the First Amendment.' If the central meaning of
the First Amendment is to protect speech from oppression,
then the apparently arbitrary, unexamined exclusion of any
particular expressive act (in this case, certain sexually explicit
expressions) debases the meaning of the First Amendment
itself.5 9
The development of an indeterminate constitutional test
such as Roth provided was particularly striking in the context
of the extensively researched, cogently argued concurrence by
Judge Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the
lower court opinion.6° Judge Frank pointedly noted that the
"Victorian morality" underlying the post-Hicklin decisions had
developed in the United States well after the First Amend-
ment was adopted.6' Thus, Judge Frank argued, the Court
should interpret the First Amendment in light of the much
more open views of the Framers, rather than the "prudish"
views of the Victorians.62 On the other hand, in light of subse-
quent developments, the Roth court's refusal to abandon cate-
gorical exclusion of some forms of sexual discourse may appear
more prescient than prudish.
By the time of Roth a whole new wave of sexually explicit
materials was hitting the marketplace of ideas. This new sex-
ual discourse was carried out in pictures whose messages were
very difficult to control. Pictorial messages may be difficult to
control because such representations tend to blur the bright
lines of print-based discourse.6 3 For example, the multiplicity
of their pictorial messages cannot be as easily controlled
because enforceable distinctions between the various messages
they seem to carry cannot be made. As Judge Woolsey noted
in Ulysses, pictures never leave the realm of the concrete, so
58. For a detailed discussion of the ramifications of such unprincipled First
Amendment decision-making, see Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical
Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1982).
59. For further discussion of the debasement of the First Amendment, see infra
Section III of this Comment.
60. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801-27 (1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(including Appendix to the case).
61. Id. at 808.
62. Id. at 808-09.
63. MEYRowrrz, supra note 28, at 93-100.
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their meanings are difficult to understand and delimit within
the context of abstract rational discourse. Because pictures
seem to portray reality unmitigated by the relatively detached
rationality created by print, pictures can be exploited for the
lowest of purposes.6
In sum, pictorial images are relatively fixed and concrete
because they present their images rather than explain them.
Thus, their expressive content is nearly impossible to control
short of preventing their distribution from the outset. As a
result, the traditional remedy for undesirable speech-"more
speech""-may not be effective in fighting the messages con-
veyed by pictures. As noted, viewed in this light, Justice Bren-
nan's Roth opinion may indeed appear more prescient than
prudish.
By 1966, however, a plurality of the Court was prepared to
abandon unexplained assumptions about the utter worthless-
ness of sexually explicit materials. In a case involving John
Cleland's Fanny Hill, the Court turned its Roth assumption
that obscenity is totally worthless into the Memoirs test for
obscenity.' Under the Memoirs test, a work is not obscene
unless it is "utterly without redeeming social significance.
67
This new insight that a presumption of social worthless-
ness begs the essential question as to whether sexually explicit
materials should be protected never commanded a majority of
the Court. Instead, there ensued a series of per curium deci-
sions, beginning with Redrup v. New York," wherein each
member of the Court applied his own unspecified test to deter-
mine whether a work was obscene.69 In these cases, the Court
offered much individual-case justice but little overall public
guidance regarding the duties and limitations created by the
Memoirs test. Thus, seemingly totally unstandardized analysis
of First Amendment obscenity doctrine became the norm.
The inability of the Redrup era Courts to cope with the
onslaught of the new sexual discourse elicited by the conjunc-
64. See generally, DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: OR WHAT HAPPENED TO THE
AMERICAN DREAM (1962); see also, MARSHALL McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA:
THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 177 (1964) [hereinafter McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA].
65. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-55 (1974).
66. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
67. Id. at 418.
68. 386 U.S. 767, reh'g denied sub. nom Austin v. Kentucky, 388 U.S. 924 (1967).
69. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 81-82 & n.8 (1972), reh'g
denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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tion of modern media with sexually explicit messages repre-
sents a collapse of meaning in the face of a troubling paradox.
The Court faced on one side the possibility of the wholesale
commercialization of sexuality through the mass distribution
of sexually explicit materials. Such commercialization
threatened to trivialize sexuality by reducing it to entertain-
ment-entertainment that was both exploitive and amoral.
The Court faced on the other side the possibility of wholesale
censorship of sexually explicit materials under the aegis of the
First Amendment. But using First Amendment doctrine to
censor a form of expression appeared contrary to the free
speech ideals the amendment was supposed to protect.
Unable to resolve these difficult and conflicting problems,
the Court retreated into silence. By issuing per curium deci-
sions without explaining its findings, the Court allowed the
meaning of obscenity doctrine to collapse. 0
Perhaps in response to this collapse of meaning, the Court
reexamined traditional First Amendment values in 1973."' To
the other Memoirs/Roth requirements, the Court added a
requirement that a work be of serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value. This new approach, known as the
Miller test, stated that:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.72
This new test, which is still applied today, was the first
test of obscenity since Roth to command a majority of the
Court. It attempts to shore-up a collapsing First Amendment
obscenity doctrine. As the next section will show, it cannot
succeed. On the contrary, the Miller test may well have accel-
erated the implosive forces acting on the First Amendment.
70. This "collapse of meaning" is the central focus of the third section of this
Comment concerning the "absorption thesis" and the "Paratroopers' Paradox." See
ifr0a text accompanying notes 73-127.
71. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, rehg denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
72. Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted).
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III. THE PARATROOPERS' PARADOX, THE ABSORPTION THESIS,
AND THE Miller TEST
Before examining the relationships between the media and
the Miller test, two heuristic devices, the Paratroopers' Para-
dox7" and the absorption thesis,74 must first be explained. The
application of these heuristics will reveal that the First
Amendment is in danger of collapse because of the paradoxical
and implosive forces at work in the postmodern media.
A. The Paradox Explained
The Paratroopers' Paradox is underpinned by the precept
that the First Amendment was intended to protect speech
from unjust oppression. Yet no agreement has ever been
reached on the meaning of the term speech, the reasons for
protecting it, or the limits on the means and meaning of
oppressing it. Each of these concepts has been, to differing
degrees, the subject of First Amendment theory and doctrine.
Despite the prodigious body of literature and law on the sub-
ject, however, these theories have failed to recognize either the
full possibilities for the debasing of the First Amendment
embodied in the modern media, or the potential impossibility
of protecting speech from such debasement, whatever speech
may be. The idea that a significant new threat to the First
Amendment may now exist as a result of the advent of modern
electronic media is one element of the analysis in Paratroop-
ers' Paradox.
Traditional First Amendment theorists may be categorized
into three groups: (1) the classicists, who hold that govern-
ment may be empowered to regulate electronic mass communi-
cations that do not promote traditionally important First
73. See Collins & Skover, Paratroopers, supra note 2. The summary of the
"Paradox" given here is necessarily simplified, with apologies to Professors Collins and
Skover. The importance of the Paradox for the study of media and the First
Amendment requires the reader to have at least a limited familiarity with it. Along
these lines, one additional caveat is necessary. The delineation of the Paratroopers'
Paradox is intended as a heuristic, that is, a model designed to stimulate thought. It
creates a "trichotomy" of First Amendment doctrine. Whether such a trichotomy is
extant, and whether anyone falls neatly into any of the three models, is neither
relevant nor important. The point is to identify the archetypal paradigms of current
First Amendment jurisprudence, and then to examine the discontinuities between
those archetypes and current realities. The question raised is whether current modes
of thinking about the First Amendment lack efficacy in the face of the effects of the
postmodern media.
74. See supra note 16.
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Amendment values; 75 (2) the modernists, who hold that all
forms of discourse that contribute to self-realization may be
protected;76  and (3) the reformists, who see the dangers
implied in the trivialization of public discourse on the one
hand, and the dangers of governmental censorship on the
other. But the reformists believe that regulation can be lim-
ited so as not to infringe on fundamental rights.77 While these
three approaches to the First Amendment cover a wide terri-
tory, they are all threatened by "the new pleasure principle.
78
The new pleasure principle describes the conjunction of
the imagistic, nonsequential, and nonrational 79  electronic
media8° on the one hand, with the trivializing tendencies of
commercialization on the other.8 This conjunction of non-
75. Collins & Skover, Paratroopers, supra note 2, at 1109-12 (citing Professors
Meiklejohn and Anastaplo as classicists).
76. Id. at 1112-14 (citing Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool as "[p]erhaps the most
highly regarded" modernist).
77. Id. at 1114-15 (citing consumer protection advocate Ralph Nader and public-
interest lawyer Claire Riley as reformists).
78. Id. at 1090-97. The new pleasure principle is based on Freud's "old" pleasure
principle-the conception of the human psyche as insatiably in search of pleasure.
79. Id. at 1095. "Imagistic" means simply that electronic media (particularly visual
media, but also aural ones) present images rather than engaging in discursive
description. "Nonsequential" points to the tendency for the presentation of images to
be disconnected by comparison to the linearity of print media. The consequences of
the presentational nature of electronic media are several, including. 1) their messages
are concrete, rather than abstract; 2) their messages are ambiguous, rather than
precise; and 3) their messages are expressive, rather than intercommunicative. See
MEYRowrrz, supra note 28, at 93-99. In sum, these dichotomies tend to illustrate the
distinction between written discourse, which is based on print conventions such as
abstraction and more precise intercommunication, and the electronic media's
presentation of concrete, ambiguous, and relatively indeterminate images. While
meaning in written discourse is generally more controlled, precise, and verifiable,
there is probably no way to control the expressive content of presentational messages,
nor to verify their meaning to all observers. Thus, presentational media are
considered "nonrational" relative to discursive media.
80. It must be noted here that Professors Collins and Skover focus exclusively on
the effects of television in Paratroopers, while this Comment necessarily implicates
other electronic media such as radio, film, video, and recorded music. However, the
effects of these various electronic media are largely analogous; to the extent that they
are not analogous, relevant distinctions will be noted. Collins & Skover, Paratroopers,
supra note 2.
81. See Collins & Skover, Paratroopers, supra note 2, at 1097-1106; see also Collins
& Skover, Commerce and Communications, upra note 2:
In the new age of 'reason,' mass advertising asserts preferred constitutional
status by associating itself with classified communications. Yet, it does so
talismanically. Merely by invoking the norm of informed and rational
decisionmaking, imagistic advertising professes to promote it. By assuming
the weighty importance of reason, mass advertising does precisely what it does
best: it appropriates the symbols of informational advertising, reconstructs
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rational forces threatens to undermine the classical values of
serious public discourse by trivializing all discourse.82 In other
words, modern media debase the serious public discourse that
the First Amendment was designed to protect; therefore,
according to the classicists, modern media must be removed
from the protection of the First Amendment.' However,
much of the traditional print-based discourse that classicists
honor and respect is now carried on, albeit in greatly altered
form, within the modern media." Thus, by eliminating protec-
tion for these media, the classicist risks allowing the censor-
ship of a great deal of serious public discourse. Such an
oppressive approach appears contrary to the classicist's funda-
mental desire to protect speech through the First Amendment.
The classicist is caught in a dilemma.'
The classicists' restrictive view of the scope of First
Amendment protections is difficult for the modernist to stom-
ach. The contradiction of the essence of First Amendment
purpose-protecting speech from oppression-is clear in the
modernist mind. Contrary to such a restrictive, classical view,
the modernist advocates full protection for the modern
media.' But such undifferentiated protections unleash the full
trivializing potential of the modern commercial media and
sound the starting gun for the race to the bottom. As sound-
bite discourse and cartoon politics and news gain in popularity,
the social climate becomes less favorable for the kinds of
meaningful political participation and rational discourse neces-
sary to maintain democratic institutions."7 Meaningful dissent
them in its own image, and returns them to the legal community in the form
of constitutional defenses.
Id. at 52.
82. Collins & Skover, Paratroopers, supra note 2, at 1095-1106. Collins and Skover
proffer several media theories to explain the trivializing effect of electronic media: (1)
because these media compress reality and disconnect it from a broader human context,
they reduce all discourse to entertainment; Id. at 1095; (2) because these media are
imagistic, they tend to encourage observers to respond emotionally, rather than
rationally; Id. at 1096; (3) because these media are subjected to the competition of the
marketplace, and because they tend to treat all their messages equally, all messages,
including serious political discourse, are carried down in the proverbial "race to the
bottom"; Id. at 1097-1106; and (4) because the competition of the market also places a
premium on time, these media tend to produce decontextualized, nonrational, "sound-
bite discourse." Id. at 1101.
83. 1& at 1110-12.
84. Id. at 1119.
85. Id& at 1117-19.
86. Id, at 1112-14.
87. I& at 1112.
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may be squelched, and all discourse sunk to the level of "the
lowest passions. "" The modernist First Amendment becomes
trivialized. 9
Perhaps in a reaction against classicist oppression of
speech on one side and against modernist trivialization of
speech on the other side, the reformist stands the middle
ground. By attempting to develop uses of media that may edu-
cate the populace on the dangers of trivialization, the reform-
ists infuse the media with meaning and purpose and fight both
opposing dangers.9  Nonetheless, by using the media, the
reformists subject their messages to the media's tendency to
trivialize. That is, if the reforms are to gain an audience for
their message they must either control the media or compete
with them. On the one hand, to maintain a forum in the face
of strong competition, reformists must place restrictions on
others who would use the media to convey trivialities. On the
other hand, if reformists refuse to stoop to such censorship,
they must compete with other messages on the same entertain-
ment-based terms they hope to undermine if they are to pull
viewers away from the more entertaining, albeit trivial, fare.9
Such tightrope walking is likely to be ineffectual, because the
forces on either side of the reformists will be working uncon-
strained by any need of great care to pull them to one side or
the other.9
2
Now that the paradoxical relationship between First
Amendment theory and modern media has been examined, the
Paradox itself becomes clear. The purpose of the First Amend-
ment is to provide for the values of civic dissent, citizenship,
and rational discourse by protecting some forms and models of
expression. But the extension of First Amendment protection
to the commercial mass media seems to undermine those tradi-
tional First Amendment values. Classicist protection of serious
discourse results in a censorship of the media through applica-
tion of the First Amendment; modernist openness to all forms
of media results in trivialization of discourse under the protec-
tion of the First Amendment; and reformist attempts to bal-
ance between censorship and triviality result in ineffectual
protection of speech under a debased First Amendment.
88. Id, at 1121 (citing ALDous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 41 (1958)).
89. Collins & Skover, Paratroopers, supra note 2, at 1116.
90. Id. at 1114-15.
91. Id. at 1121-23.
92. Id,
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B. The Absorption Thesis Explained
The second heuristic model of interest is the absorption
thesis. It is essentially an extension of the theories of Jean
Baudrillard regarding the "implosion of meaning in the
media."93 This is a highly abstract and difficult concept, but
its implications for obscenity doctrine argue strongly for an
examination of its possibilities. To oversimplify:
Baudrillard examines the deeper implications of Marshall
McLuhan's aphorism-"the medium is the message. '
McLuhan discussed the tendency of all media to affect
messages, to absorb"5 them, to change them, and to reproduce
them in an altered form. 6  Further, he recognized the power
of media, as extensions of an individual's senses, to absorb indi-
viduals.' Baudrillard extends these concepts to the mass: the
93. BAUDRILLARD, SHADOW, supra note 16, at 95-110.
94. MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA, supra note 64.
95. BAUDRILLARD, SHADow, supra note 16, at 1-12. The concept of "absorption"
should be understood in the sense of consumption and digestion. After undergoing
such a process, the original message is no longer recognizable. Once the message has
been absorbed by the modern media, its meaning to any potential observer is forever
changed. Indeed, although the sights and sounds of the original message are still
present, the meaning of the message has been absorbed, much as nutrition is absorbed
in the digestive process. The waste, the message that is now reproduced by the
medium, consists largely of its "sensational" meaning. The observer senses the visual
and auditory stimuli coming from the medium, but understands little of the original
message.
96. See generally McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA, supra note 64. The
absorption of meaning is largely restricted to electronic media, though all media,
hicluding books, affect their messages in fundamental ways.
McLuhan's work has often been severely criticized. See, e.g., McLUHAN HOT &
COOL (Gerald E. Stern ed. 1967) (collection of critical essays and McLuhan's response).
However, at least one highly respected scholar, Charles Van Doren, has recently given
UNDERSTANDING MEDIA high praise: "In this work McLuhan offered for general
consideration many exaggerations, all of them provocative and demanding thought. As
a consequence, the book, although no longer widely read, is one of the most important
of the twentieth century." CHARLES VAN DOREN, A HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE 357
(1991). Van Doren was for twenty years the editorial director of the ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA. He is an acclaimed author and is currently Associate Director of the
Institute for Philosophical Research in Chicago.
97. See MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA, supra note 64. See also MARSHALL
McLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE: AN INVENTORY OF
EFFECTS (1967) (the spelling of "Massage" is correct; it is a play on the effect of loss of
self discussed in this footnote). The idea of the absorption of the individual is
obviously a highly literary device. Essentially, this concept many be roughly equated
with a loss of a sense of "self-in-one-place" due to the individual's sensation that her
senses are extended by the modern media. See MEYROwITz, supra note 28 (this work
is premised on the loss of the "sense of place" engendered by modern media; thus, the
title, No SENSE OF PLACE).
As an example of this sensation, consider a long distance telephone conversation.
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undifferentiated crowd of modern observers that McLuhan
asserts is created by the electronic media.98
For Baudrillard, the mass is itself a medium--one which,
like all media, absorbs meaning and reproduces altered
messages.99 But the mass is the strongest medium; as a result,
other media and their meanings are simply absorbed within
the mass."° To use Baudrillard's analogy, the mass is to
media/meanings as a ground, or earth, is to electromagnetic
energy. 101 Just as a ground absorbs and dissipates that energy,
the mass absorbs and dissipates media/meanings. It is not so
much that the mass is doing anything, but rather, that its abil-
ity to absorb media/meanings without effect or response is
unlimited.10 2 Baudrillard calls this total absorption of media/
meanings in the masses "implosion.' 0 3
At the point of the implosion of meaning in the masses,
"simulation" begins. 1 4 That is, because the mass, or "silent
majority," exists but refuses to be represented,10 5 all attempts
to represent the mass, such as surveys, polls, and referenda,
An individual experiences the extension of her sense of hearing to a greatly removed
distance. She is "hearing" someone speak who is one hundred miles away and,
figuratively, her "self" has expanded to include that distance. Further, media that
extend more than one sense, like television, may create a sense of self that is spread
over many miles in many different directions. Because of these (perhaps largely
unconscious) effects of electronic media, the sense of self may be said to be absorbed
into the media: the individual self-concept is replaced by the extended self-concept.
98. See McLuHAN & FORE, supra note 97, at 68.
99. BAUDRILLARD, SHADOW, supra note 16, at 44.
100. I
101. Id at 5.
102. Id. at 9. The larger implications of Baudrillard's assertion here are not clear
from the text. He interprets the utter silence of the masses affirmatively. That is,
while political theorists have sometimes attributed the silence of the masses to an
apathy engendered by political control and manipulation through the media,
Baudrillard finds such assertions condescending and naive. On the contrary, the
masses "refuse" meaning. Id. at 10. They resist the "hegemony of meaning" through
the inertia of their silence. Id. Thus, the masses cannot be manipulated through the
media because they reject the "dialectic of meaning" in favor of the fascination of the
spectacular. Id. at 10-11.
103. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS 57 (Paul Foss, Paul Patton & Philip
Beitchman trans., 1983) [hereinafter BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS]; BAUDRILLARD,
SHADOW, supra note 16, at 9. Baudrillard analogizes the process of the implosion of
meaning in the masses to a black hole. d He suggests that the political order, which
has only ever been a "tiny fraction and superficial layer of our 'societies,'" is, like a
spaceship of state attempting to maintain orbit around the event horizon of a black
hole, frantically projecting meaning into the abyss, the mass. Id
104. Id. See also BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS, supra note 103, at 57.
105. BAUDRILLARD, SHADOW, supra note 16, at 20.
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are mere simulations of discourse. l 6 "[T]he answer[s are]
called forth by the question[s]."' °7  "Every message is a
verdict."' 08
To the extent that answers are anticipated within ques-
tions, the yes/no's and on/off's of the pollsters' trade, the
answers are mere simulacra of reality. They are reality
imposed on reality. This condition, wherein all messages
received from the silent majority are the mere simulations of
public opinion, Baudrillard calls "hyperreality."'
Thanks to the modern media, we live in hyperreality. The
dialectical poles of discourse are absorbed into each other by
the circularity of media effects: the imposition of meaning on
the masses through polling, the masses' subsequent absorption
of that meaning, the reimposition of that meaning through
polling, and so on. 10
Thus, media become the models of a reality "more real
than real""' and reproduction of reality effects becomes the
sine qua non of postmodern sociopolitical discourse."' Hyper-
reality is "the implosion of the medium and the real;""'
hyperreality is the absorption of the poles of reality and its
representation into each other, the absorption of reality and
art into the single model: 1 4 the medium is the mass-age is the
medium is the mass-age....
C. Paradox, Absorption, and Obscenity Doctrine
The historical development of obscenity doctrine described
106. BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS, supra note 103, at 116-17.
107. Id.
108. Id. That is, "[tihe referendum is always an ultimatum: the unilateral nature
of the question, that is no longer exactly an interrogation, but the immediate
imposition of a sense whereby the cycle is suddenly completed." Id.
109. BAUDRILLARD, SHADOW, supra note 16, at 99; BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS,
supra note 103, at 146.
110. BAUDRILLARD, SHADOW, supra note 16, at 101.
111. Id. at 99.
112. For instance, the political system must create the reality effects of "real"
choice and the efficacy of the individual vote. In the context of postmodern
democracy, "[t]he 'free choice' of individuals, which is the credo of democracy, leads in
fact precisely to the opposite: the vote becomes functionally obligatory: if it is not
legally, it is by statistical constraint .... reinforced by the polls. The vote becomes
functionally aleatory: when democracy attains an advanced formal stage, it distributes
itself around equal quotients (50/50). The vote comes to resemble a Brownian
movement of particles or the calculation of probabilities. It is as if everyone voted by
chance, or monkeys voted." BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS, supra note 103, at 132.
113. Id. at 101.
114. Id. at 102.
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earlier may now be seen as a microcosm of the larger Paradox
of the First Amendment. First, the classicist fears that protec-
tion of sexually explicit materials will debase the First
Amendment values furthered by "serious" public discourse.
Such debasement occurs by virtue of the association of the
high ideals of the First Amendment with the "low value
speech""' 5 of sexual discourse. This trivialization is avoided by
developing legal standards such as Hicklin that place a very
low premium on supposedly low value speech. Unfortunately,
these same loose standards may well be applied to serious
works. Therefore, in order to protect the First Amendment
from censorship, the classicist must censor, and the Paradox is
realized.
Second, reacting to a perceived threat to First Amendment
principles embodied in classicist censorship, the modernist
seeks to bring obscenity under the protective umbrella of those
principles. In the process, the modernist may be forced to
acknowledge that all forms of sexual speech must be
allowed."' This modernist approach encourages the develop-
ment of standards such as the Memoirs test, which protects all
speech unless it is totally worthless. Modernist theory also
contributes to the total collapse of meaning typified by the
Redrup era. As a result, serious public discourse is equated
with trivialized, objectified, and irrational sexual speech, and
the First Amendment itself becomes trivial.
Finally, perhaps in an effort to avoid the Scylla and Cha-
rybdis of censorship and trivialization,117 the reformist
attempts to balance the standards by reasserting whatever val-
ues are perceived to be missing. This approach is typified by
Miller's reintroduction of a serious value concept in the face of
the collapse of meaning following Redrup. Unfortunately, as
the subsequent analysis will show, the attempt falls prey to
one side of the Paradox or the other. Either the censorship
standard is so generous that even serious materials are cen-
sored, or the censorship standard is so restrictive that all sexu-
115. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986
DuKE L.J. 589, 602-608.
116. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in Bold
Relief- A Reply, in Colloquy: The First Amendment and the Paratroopers Paradox, 68
TEX. L. REv. 1185, 1186-87 (1990) [hereinafter, Collins & Skover, Paratroopers' Reply].
117. Collins & Skover, Paratroopers, supra note 2, at 1122 (arguing that the
reformists may indeed recognize the Paradox, and formulate their reforms
accordingly).
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ally explicit materials would be protected. Consequently, the
reformist attempt to balance triviality and censorship results
in ineffectual regulation,l l8 and the First Amendment is trivi-
alized nonetheless.
In addition to the dangers presented by the Paradox,
reformist methodology is also threatened by the peril of
absorption. Reformists attempt to create meaning and purpose
in the context of the electronic media by creating meaningful
messages and attempting to project that meaning onto the
masses. These messages, however, are subject to resistance
both from absorption by the media and from the inertia of the
masses.
As to absorption, the messages of the reformists, transmit-
ted by the all-absorbing media, will be transmuted. The exact
nature of the resultant reproduction by the media will be inde-
terminate because of the aleatory nature of the absorption pro-
cess. These outcomes, however, move toward one of two poles
of media-determined meaning. No matter the original input,
the resultant message will reflect either 1) the compressed,
disconnected, arational, and decontextualized contents of typi-
cal electronic media fare,"9  or 2) the pseudorational,
pseudolinearity of "talking heads" television. 20
Moreover, even those poles are likely to collapse and
merge under the hypergravity of the inertial masses. After all,
the talking heads model of information creation is the paradig-
matic example of meaning imposed on the masses, which is
then resisted through absorption and silence, thereby implod-
ing meaning. As a result, the reformists' talking heads televi-
sion is not only ineffectual because its messages are absorbed,
but it is also counterproductive because it accelerates the
absorption process, calling forth only resistance and silence
from the masses.
Thus, the reformists' attempts to represent the masses,
118. Id. at 1121-23.
119. See supra note 79.
120. While talking heads are becoming increasingly rare on television, a few still
exist. See, e.g., the individuals listed in Paratroopers, supra note 2, at 1106 & nn.96-98
(Bill Moyers, Ted Koppel, and William F. Buckley, Jr.). While Professors Collins and
Skover cite these individuals as paragons of talking heads rationality, and rare
exceptions to the current television rule, the listing has two distinct failings: 1) Some
might consider one or more persons on this kind of list fine examples of the "celebrity
anchors" decried in Paratroopers, id at n.83, albeit in a somewhat outdated model; and
2) some might wonder at the exclusion of such notable talking heads as McNeil and
Leherer and their co-anchors.
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and to influence them, will meet with willful silence. Indeed,
the reformists' attempts will be absorbed into the circularity of
hyperreality: as reformists infuse the silent masses with mean-
ing, constantly testing and polling and randomly imposing
meaning on silence, the masses will silently absorb every bit
without effect or response.
D. Paradox, Absorption, and the Miller Test
The absorption thesis and the Paradox are especially rele-
vant to the three elements of the Miller test. The first two ele-
ments of the Miller test, prurient interest and patently
offensive conduct, are measured by contemporary community
standards.' These community standards are greatly influ-
enced by the effects of modern media. Consequently, resting
First Amendment protections on community standards may
result in a kind of absorption of the Miller test. Ultimately,
the community absorption will produce a debasement of the
Miller standards similar to the debasement of the Roth stan-
dards during the Redrup era. In other words, the invasive
nature of modern media and mass communications will cause
the prurient interest and patently offensive conduct elements
to be absorbed.
In the specific context of the prurient interest element,
the Paradox and absorption theories have clear implications.
This element, based on perceptions of what is or is not sexually
arousing in the community, subjects the standard for deter-
mining obscenity to the very group most threatened by the
degradation of community standards. The exception of obscen-
ity from the First Amendment was designed to protect against
this very degradation. In the face of the new pleasure princi-
ple, which may be driving the larger community unconsciously
and uncontrollably to maximize both pleasure and profits, such
a standard is in danger of being absorbed into the mass move-
ment toward total permissiveness without offering the slight-
est resistance.
The same can be said for the patently offensive conduct
element. As sexual discourse is commercialized, infinite num-
bers of identical representations of sexuality proliferate in
121. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973). In other
words, the trier of fact must determine, based on its own determination of the
standards of the relevant community, whether the work in question appeals to the
prurient interest in a patently offensive manner.
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response to demands bolstered by such commercial appeals.
Such commodification of sexuality threatens to undermine the
patently offensive conduct element by absorbing it. Between
the daily inundation of sexual innuendo and idealized concep-
tualizations of sexuality proliferating in the advertising media
on the one hand, and the apparently enormous market for
commercial home videos of explicit sex on the other, the aver-
age person would seem to be well acquainted with patently
offensive conduct. And only in this average person's idea of
what is normal, inoffensive sexual behavior can patently offen-
sive sexual behavior be defined. Therefore, if the average per-
son is commonly exposed to materials that will undermine
serious public discourse, this element of the Miller test will not
prevent the First Amendment from being trivialized.
When society can point to a very large number of partici-
pants in given "deviant" behaviors, such as watching sex
videos, the strength of the argument that society as a whole
must be protected from such behaviors is absorbed by the
sheer multitude of that "other" portion of society. Because the
combination of commodification and commercialization may
create an ever-increasing demand for a given product (here,
sexually explicit videos), a legal standard based on any societal
consensus is inevitably debased by its own shrinking consensus.
To this point, the description of the absorption of the pru-
rient interest and patently offensive conduct elements may
appear to be a needlessly obscure way of saying that commu-
nity standards will evolve in relation to the community's expo-
sure to sexually explicit materials. Indeed, it might be argued
that the Miller elements are purposefully designed to allow for
just this sort of evolution by resting obscenity determinations
on the relative levels of tolerance in the various communities.
Moreover, the argument might continue, the community's
standards are not absorbed at all, but simply developed.
Finally, this argument may conclude that the community stan-
dards are not in danger because the community will know
when to say when.
But such arguments fail to recognize the deeper implica-
tions of the absorption thesis. If the thesis is correct, then
community standards are not merely being altered by exposure
to media-transmitted sexual messages. Instead, the standards
are being emptied of meaning through the process of absorp-
[Vol. 15:415
Law in the Electronic Brothel
tion by the media and the masses. This process may occur as
follows:
First, the meanings of the sexual messages themselves are
absorbed by the media. A primary example would be sexually
explicit home video movies or cable channel movies. As view-
ers observe the sexual activities portrayed, they interact
directly with the images presented; they watch; they do not
carefully analyze; they do not attempt to rationally dissect
what they are seeing. Unlike reading descriptions of sexual
encounters, watching television images of them does not as
readily activate the viewers' visual imaginations. Instead, tele-
vision largely replaces the viewers' imaginations with its own
invasive images and thereby stifles the viewers' powers of con-
templation. As a result, viewers receive an indeterminant
meaning from what they are seeing.
Second, the demand for such video and cable movies,
driven by the new pleasure principle, grows rapidly. Such con-
sumption calls forth more production, which calls forth more
consumption, and so on. To an outside observer of this process
the community appears to be developing new standards,
becoming more tolerant. However, this message is being gen-
erated by the outside observer, not by the community. The
community itself is silent as to its views on these materials.
In actuality, the outside observer has attempted to ration-
alize the community's consumption of indeterminant images by
imposing meaning on the statistic of consumption itself:
greater demand for sexually explicit materials must mean
greater tolerance of those materials. But it does not.
That demand is not equivalent to tolerance is the focus of
the third and final point of the absorption process. The outside
observer needs to impose meaning on the perceived demands
of the community for sexually explicit home movies, and that
need stems from the community's silence on its own views of
such movies. The community is silent not because it has no
opinion, but because it has no voice. The community cannot
say when. Yet because television creates the illusion of dis-
course where only the one-way communication of meaning
imposition has occurred, the political entities that control such
meaning imposition are convinced they know what the people
are thinking.
When face-to-face town meetings flourished, this politics
of discourse gave voice and meaning to the demands and for-
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bearances of the community. Now, however, the modern
media have given the community an identity beyond politics.
The desires of the community, the masses, the silent majority,
can seemingly be learned by examining individuals' consump-
tion of sexually explicit materials and then extrapolating these
statistics into an evolving community opinion. Yet such
extrapolations of the otherwise meaningless consumption of
indeterminant images are merely futile attempts to manufac-
ture meaning where none exists.
Meaning and the accompanying community standards are
both being absorbed by the media and by the community. In
this process, meaning and community standards are not merely
being changed; they are being destroyed. No meaning is left to
be changed. If the prurient interest and patently offensive
conduct standards have been absorbed, however, the solidity of
the remaining element must also be examined.
The third element of the Miller test, "whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value," was originally an outgrowth of the "utterly
without redeeming social importance" test from Roth.'22 Until
recently, the Court had not clarified whether this element was
to be determined by a community standard or by an objective
standard. Because this element contained no specific reference
to community standards, however, courts had treated it as a
mixed question of law and fact. 23 As a result, it was less likely
to be subject to absorption than the prurient interest and
patently offensive conduct standards.
So long as this was true, the serious value requirement
could be seen as the constitutional safety valve that the Court
had reserved to itself for emergencies, such as the need to pro-
tect First Amendment principles from absorption. The courts
could perform their function of determining First Amendment
standards by finding the existence or absence of serious value
in sexually explicit materials. This finding of serious value by
a court might have been as complex as Justice Woolsey's liter-
ary analysis in Ulysses,1 24 or as brief as a Redrup era per
curium decision without opinion.
122. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 909.
123. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977) (implying that Miller
rejected community standards for the serious value element because it contains no
such limitations, as do the first two elements).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
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In light of the Paradox, this element of the Miller stan-
dard reveals itself as a microcosm of the larger dilemma. Thus,
the classicist's limitation of First Amendment protection to
serious discourse tends to preclude any sexually explicit
messages carried by modern media from First Amendment
protection because those messages are trivializing. 125 In the
face of such apparent threats of censorship, modernists will
argue, and courts may accept, that all manner of sexually-
related materials are of serious social value. Finally, reform-
ists will argue that the reformed Miller standard of serious
value is itself in need of reform. This argument also falls to
the dilemma.
The Court's recent application of the reasonable person
standard to the serious value element is an example of this
reformist approach. 26 Perhaps in response to the perceived
danger of erosion of serious discourse, or the perceived danger
of judicial censorship, the Court decided that the serious value
element should be measured by the reasonable person stan-
dard.127 This attempt at reform may fail due to either of two
conflicting reasons.
On the one hand, because the reasonable person standard
may require juries to apply local community standards of what
is reasonable, the serious value element may now be judged by
some form of community standard similar to that used in the
prurient interest and patently offensive elements. Thus, the
reform may abandon the safety valve originally afforded by
Miller. As a result, the serious value element may be subject
to absorption like the other elements.
On the other hand, the Court's subjecting the serious
value element to the reasonable person standard may signal a
125. Indeed, at least two commentators have suggested that such limitations
should be imposed; however, they approach the problem from opposite ends. Neil
Postman, a leading media ecologist, has suggested the possibility of eliminating all
forms of political discourse, including speeches, advertising, or debates, from television.
See generally, NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN
THE AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS (1985). In contrast, Professor Sunstein has advocated the
possibility of restricting the effects of antipornography statutes (that is, statutes
attempting to abolish depictions of violence against women involving sex) to television
and movies. Sunstein, supra note 115, at 625. Thus, while each recognizes the
relevance of the media to these questions, both fall on the side of censorship.
126. In Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), obscenity charges were brought against
two adult bookstore clerks. Id. at 499. The Court held that the reasonable person
standard should be applied to determine whether a sexually explicit work has serious
value. Id. at 500-01.
127. Id. at 501.
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recognition of the risk of absorption. In other words, the Court
may believe that the reasonable person standard immunizes
the Miller test from total absorption of the community stan-
dard because, as an objective standard, it creates a barrier to
such debasement of community morality. However, given the
extent to which modern media currently pervade community
consciousness, such hopeful reliance is unlikely to prove well-
founded. Consequently, this reformist attempt to adjust the
serious value element may prove ineffectual, as do all attempts
that fail to recognize the power of the modern media. The
serious value element may therefore be absorbed regardless.
To this point, when viewed in light of the broad media-
ecology heuristics, the historical development leading up to
and including the Miller standard reveals several weaknesses
in current obscenity doctrine. The failure to account for the
effects of media has resulted in a contradiction within the doc-
trine itself, a contradiction in the form of a Paradox of trivial-
ization or censorship under the First Amendment. These
heuristics have also shown that the standards themselves may
be in danger of destruction through the absorption process.
IV. CURRENT OBSCENITY DOCTRINE
The current state of obscenity doctrine in relation to
media theory must also be examined in the context of several
recent obscenity indictments that illustrate the relationship of
the absorption thesis and the Paradox to current obscenity law.
After briefly examining the broader media theories,
Skyywalker v. Navarro 12' will then be reviewed in light of spe-
cific media theories to demonstrate the benefits of examining,
and the costs of failing to examine, the effects of media on cur-
rent obscenity doctrine.
A. Montgomery and Cincinnati
In Alabama, current obscenity standards were recently
applied to messages carried on the modern media. A Mont-
gomery grand jury returned indictments against several com-
panies responsible for airing allegedly obscene movies through
satellite-relayed home movie channels. 29 The companies in
question quickly ceased broadcasting. In all, more than a mil-
128. 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla 1990).
129. Mark Curriden, But Is It Art?, BARRISTER, Winter 1990-91 12, 12.
[Vol. 15:415
Law in the Electronic Brothel
lion subscribers nationwide were affected by Montgomery's
threat of prosecution. i s
This case presents perhaps a paradigmatic example of the
absorption effect. In this case, however, the absorption effect
works to constrict First Amendment protection of sexually
explicit materials. First, the national media absorb the local
community standard. In short, the obscenity standards applied
by the Alabama grand jury were based on local standards of
obscenity; however, because of the pervasive nature of satellite
broadcast television, those local standards were being applied
to nationwide communications. As a result, the local standard
was replicated on a national scale. Second, de facto national
censorship resulted from the application of those local commu-
nity standards to nationwide communications.
In addition to the Alabama case, which involved the elec-
tronic media of satellite communications, another recent
obscenity-related case involved the photographic medium and
the Postmodernist l 3 1 conception of art.13 2 The recent obscenity
charges against Cincinnati's Contemporary Arts Center and its
director for displaying Robert Mapplethorpe's five photo-
graphs133 attracted much media attention. The Cincinnati jury
returned a not guilty verdict, a verdict justified by some legal
scholars on the grounds that the photographs were art.' s4
However, the lines between art, entertainment, and
obscenity have become increasingly blurred in the postmodern
period. 13- Many artists are deliberately challenging traditional
130. Id.
131. The term "Postmodernism" refers to the movement in art that rejects the
formalist distinctions between "good" and "bad" art as well as those between "serious"
and "popular" art. See Adler, supra note 17, at 1362-64. In the view of this Author,
Adler develops in fine detail one aspect of the general absorption thesis put forth in
this Comment. Specifically, postmodern artists are attempting to destroy the above
distinctions, through the use of various media, by absorbing the distinctions into their
media, thereby eliminating them.
132. Following the lead of Adler, supra note 17, this Comment will not attempt a
definition of art. As Adler explained, art cannot be defined "because contemporary
[postmodern] art, by its very nature, will defy any definition that we assign to it." Id
at 1359 & n.3. That is, postmodern art makes a point of contesting whatever the
definers of art say.
133. "One of the five photographs shows a man urinating into another man's
mouth, another shows a finger inserted into a penis, and the other three each depict a
man with an object inserted in the rectum: a whip, a cylinder, and a man's hand and
forearm." N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1990, at 1, col 6.
134. See N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, at 56 (citing Professors Sunstein and Karst).
135. Adler, supra note 17, at 1364-74.
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distinctions between popular culture and "legitimate" art.136
As a result, previously clear distinctions between formal art
and popular culture are being eroded by the artists themselves.
Similarly, other artists challenge the very social norms
that established the concept of obscenity as an unworthy form
of expression. 137 Such artists may see the postmodern role of
the artist as consonant with somewhat more traditional views
of art, which hold that art should challenge its viewers to new
insights regarding their social norms. If so, what better socie-
tal norm to attack than the age-old fear of deviant sex?
Thus, artists are destroying the various distinctions
between so-called serious art and popular or obscene art. In
doing so, the artists may be creating difficulties for the courts
in determining what is of serious value for society. After all, if
depictions of sexually explicit acts are being created with artis-
tic integrity and intent, the courts may be compelled, like
Judge Woolsey in Ulysses, to find such depictions socially
valuable.
While these difficulties may be attributed to the
postmodernist perspective, that perspective itself may be a
symptom of the absorption effects of modern media. Artists
have long been challenging society's sexual norms. However,
before the modern electronic media, observation of such chal-
lenging views was largely confined to a socially acceptable loca-
tion, like a museum.
A museum is a medium for conveying certain socially
defined messages. Society defines the appropriate range of
psychic, emotional, and physical reactions to art in the
museum context. Because these societal definitions affect the
observers' perceptions and understanding of the art itself, the
museum acts as a medium for the conveyance of artistic
messages.138 As a medium, the museum appears to have simi-
136. Id at 1366 (describing artists Sherrie Levine, who photographs famous art
photographs, and David Salle, "who layers and juxtaposes images that he appropriates
from art history as well as from popular culture").
137. Id at 1369 (describing performance artist Karen Finley, who "smears food
into her genitals and has even defecated onstage" [and] graphically describes violent
and bizarre sex acts). Artist Richard Kern also defies traditional concepts of art,
creating "extremely violent pornographic art films." Id. at 1370.
138. For example, the context of Annie Sprinkle's performances seems to
determine whether her work is "obscenity" or "art." Sprinkle, a performance artist,
works in the pornography industry, appearing in magazines and X-rated films. She
also performs in art settings. In 1988, Sprinkle appeared at the Kitchen Center for the
Performing Arts; her performance included elements from another performance she
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lar effects on the messages it conveys like those conveyed
through other media.
As a result, the museum may actually absorb the meaning
of the art and reproduce an entirely different message than
intended by the artist. Such a message may be socially defined
and controlled. Therefore, to confine the presentation of such
materials to socially controlled settings is to define the art
itself.
But with the advent of the all-pervasive modern media,
the real possibility exists, perhaps for the first time, that all
members of society may be exposed to such challenging mater-
ials. If the absorption thesis is correct, then the potential is
great for the total abnegation of all societal limits on sexual
expression. Further, the distinctions between serious discourse
and trivial entertainment may also be eroded through the pro-
cess of absorption of meaning by the undifferentiated mass.
These threats of absorption of societal standards in artistic
expression have important implications for the Paradox from
the perspectives of classicists, modernists, and reformists.
First, if it is true, as the classicists believe, that categorical dis-
tinctions between serious discourse and trivial entertainment
must be drawn in order to preserve the fundamental First
Amendment value of serious public discourse, the classicists'
task may be in vain. After all, if no lines can fairly be drawn
between serious attempts to create and define art on the one
hand, and postmodern attempts to redefine art by challenging
such serious attempts on the other, then classicist attempts to
distinguish between such definition and redefinition would
seem futile.
More fundamentally, as such distinctions erode, the classi-
cists will be increasingly driven to remove all forms of artistic
expression, serious and postmodernist, from the First Amend-
ment's definition of protected speech.1 39 Thus, the Paradox is
realized and the redefinition of the First Amendment leads to
censorship of serious public discourse in the form of serious
art.
had given for a ScREw magazine party. When asked what made Sprinkle's
performance at the Kitchen "art" and her performance for ScREw "pornography," a
spokesman for the Kitchen said "[h]ere it was performed in an art context." Id. at
1369-70.
139. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28-29 (1971) (suggesting the removal of all but political
speech, narrowly defined, from under First Amendment protection).
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Second, from the modernists will come a redoubled effort
to protect all forms of speech in response to the classicists'
attempts to protect serious discourse through censorship. Clas-
sicist censorial tendencies send up a red flag for the modern-
ists. Sensing a threat, the modernists will point to the
impossibility of distinguishing between serious art and
postmodern art in any principled way.140 Thus, the modernist
will argue for the protection of all speech, no matter how triv-
ial such speech may be for the classicist.
141
From the classicists' perspective, the modernists have trivi-
alized the First Amendment's protections of serious discourse
by simply ignoring any principled distinctions between trivial
entertainment, obscenity, and serious public discourse. In
effect, the classicists argue that resting First Amendment juris-
prudence on vague distinctions like these may lead back to the
Redrup era's seeming lack of principled decision-making.
Third, from the reformists' viewpoint, the absorption of
the meaning of serious art presents the opportunity for media-
tion between the extremes of triviality and censorship. How-
ever, because the distinctions between the definitions of
serious and trivial art may be destroyed through the efforts of
postmodern artists, the very middle ground on which the
reformists base their attempts at reconciliation seems to be dis-
appearing. Principled distinctions may no longer be possible
between control of triviality or censorship of sexually explicit
messages on one side, and protection of serious discourse on
the other. Consequently, the reformists may be forced to err
on one side or the other, thereby realizing the Paradox in
either case. Alternatively, the reformists could withdraw.
Again, the reformists are left ineffectual in the face of absorp-
tion and the Paradox.
Up to this point, the general analysis of current obscenity
cases has revealed several weaknesses in obscenity doctrine
that may be ascribed to a failure to account for the effects of
media. First, by allowing indictments of national media result-
140. Ironically, by this definition, Adler, supra note 17, represents the
quintessential modernist view.
141. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, Television and the Experience of Citizenship, 68 TEx.
L. REV. 1155, 1165 (1990) (reply to Collins & Skover, Paratroopers, supra note 2, to the
effect that watching national television "may be the average person's most important
political act"); Collins & Skover, Paratroopers' Reply, supra note 116, at 1187-88
(replying to Rubin and suggesting that he has abandoned all but the most trivialized
view of First Amendment protections).
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ing from the application of local community standards, courts
may allow de facto national censorship to occur through a chil-
ling of national communications. Second, by resting determi-
nations of serious value on definitions of art, the Miller test
may be absorbed due to the effects of the modern media.
Third, and concomitant to the second point, the absorption of
the Miller standard may result in attempts by classicists to
censor artistic speech. Such censorial action could lead to mod-
ernist trivialization through sweeping protections of all speech,
or reformist ineffectuality in the face of these threats. Thus, in
obscenity doctrine, the air is thick with paradox. This paradox
becomes even more apparant in the recent case of Skyywalker
v. Navarro.14
B. Skyywalker v. Navarro
Skyywalker was a civil action brought by the rap group 2
Live Crew (the Crew) in the United States District Court of
Southern Florida against Broward County Sheriff Nicholas
Navarro. The Crew sought a declaratory judgment of their
rights regarding the Sheriff's attempts to prevent the sale of
the Crew's album, Nasty As They Wanna Be (hereinafter
Nasty). The Sheriff had obtained an order from the Broward
County Circuit Court that found probable cause to believe that,
under the Florida statutes and relevant case law, Nasty was
obscene. 43 The Sheriff's deputies then visited fifteen to
twenty Broward County record stores and warned the owners,
"in a friendly conversational tone," that if they continued to
sell the records, they would be arrested and charged with sell-
ing obscene materials."' Within a few days, no copies of Nasty
were for sale in Broward County.
145
In view of the success of the Sheriff's office in restraining
the sale of Nasty, the Crew sought to restrain the Sheriff's
activities 4 and, in addition, sought a declaration as to whether
Nasty was obscene. Applying the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard normally used in civil cases, Judge Gonzalez
142. 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
143. Id. at 583.
144. 1I Under Florida law, selling obscene materials to minors is a felony; selling
them to adults is a misdemeanor.
145. Id.
146. Id. The Crew alleged prior restraint against the Sheriff. Judge Gonzalez
agreed with the Crew's position and granted the Crew a permanent injunction against
the Sheriff. The prior restraint issue is not, however, of central concern here.
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found Nasty obscene. 147
Before turning to its application of the Miller test, the
court first reiterated the policy values underlying the First
Amendment. It noted both the classicist value of facilitating
self-government through serious discourse and the modernist
value of promoting "self-realization" in the "marketplace of
ideas."'14 The court also reiterated the Roth assumption that,
because sex is "a great and mysterious motive force in human
life,' 1 49 state regulations on explicit depictions of sex are
equivalent to state regulations on "prostitution, incest, rape,
and other sexually related conduct."'15
Turning to the Miller test, the court then asserted that dis-
tinctions between the "regulation of conduct and speech [do]
not invalidate obscenity laws.' 1 5 ' For the court, the rationale
underlying obscenity doctrine "is simple: the message con-
veyed by obscene speech is of such slight social value that it
is always outweighed by the compelling interests of society,
as manifested in the laws enacted by its elected
representatives."152
The court then turned to a brief analysis of what it called
the "absolutist" view of the First Amendment. Under this
"rugged individualist" view, any regulation of speech is labeled
" 'censorship' and 'paternalism.' ,,15' The absolutist seeks total
freedom of speech without interference from the law. 1 Mak-
ing an analogy to television, the court characterized the absolu-
tist argument as follows: "[I]f the viewer does not like what he
sees on Channel X, he may switch to Channel Y or turn off the
set. In the case of obscene music, people who do not want to
147. Id. at 596. Judge Gonzalez noted that the Crew argued for the clear and
convincing evidence standard because of the First Amendment issues presented in this
case. While the judge did not agree that the higher standard should apply in this civil
action, and so found Nasty obscene under the preponderance standard, he also later
stated that he found Nasty obscene by the clear and convincing standard as well. Id.
148. Id. at 584.
149. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 584 (quoting United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476,
487, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957)).
150. "These prohibitions are no different than a ban on obscenity." Id.
151. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25-26, rehg denied, 414 U.S. 881
(1973)). The Miller court stated that "sex and nudity may not be exploited without
limit by films and pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation any
more than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in such public
places." Id.
152. Id. at 584 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
153. Id. at 586.
154. Id,
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listen to obscenity do not have to buy it."' 5 As an example,
the court noted that in the instant case the Crew had placed
warning labels on Nasty to prevent unwary customers from
exposure to their message.1" Therefore, the court implied that
the Crew is absolutist because it seeks to allow individuals to
determine what they will see and hear without reference to
societal norms. 5 7
The court's discussion is a caricatured description of only
one aspect of the much more complex modernist view of First
Amendment protections. While it is true that modernists/
absolutists eventually arrive at a position of advocating protec-
tion of certain materials that classicists would consider
obscene, they arrive at that position through a complex process
of balancing the concerns of the State and of society. The
court's oversimplification allows the court to then dismiss the
modernists/absolutists by referring them to the state legisla-
ture. According to the court, the absolutists are either insin-
cere in their arguments to the court, or they are not saying
what they mean." What they really mean to say is: "Let's
Legalize Obscenity!"' 5 9 Of course, any desire to abrogate estab-
lished statutes must be directed to the state legislature. The
court is not a "Super-legislature."'"
But this iteration of the limits of court powers begs the
question. The point of the modernists' arguments that obscene
speech may to some degree contribute to self-realization is not
to argue against the State's criminalization of obscenity. Nor is
the modernist's point to extend the scope of judicial powers.
The modernist's point is to examine the underlying rationales
of the classicists who say that only a limited range of speech
should be protected under the First Amendment. The central
issue is whether the First Amendment's protections prevent
the State from suppressing certain forms of speech. Such
examination must precede application of state law, not follow
it.
Of course, the court might respond that the decision has
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Amendment. 6' Again, this begs the issue. If it is not true that
discrete categories of speech can be defined as serious or triv-
ial, then the court's assertion that it is merely applying the law
is without foundation. Some determination of what obscenity
is under First Amendment doctrine must precede any applica-
tion of criminal statutes. Such determinations are made by
courts. Therefore, the courts are the correct fora in which to
bring modernist, classicist, and reformist arguments regarding
the nature and meaning of obscenity doctrine, not the legisla-
tures. Apparently recognizing its responsibilities to make such
determinations under the First Amendment, the court next
turned to an analysis of whether Nasty is obscene under the
Miller standards.
162
Before applying the Miller elements, the court first deter-
mined which community's standards should be applied to the
prurient interest and patently offensive conduct elements of
the test. This is a question for the trier of fact. 6 ' Because the
parties assumed that the relevant community would likely be
Broward County, where the Sheriff's activities occurred, they
failed to present any evidence indicating the extent of the rele-
vant community."8 Citing this failure, the court determined
that it had the power as the fact-finder to define the relevant
community. 65 While the court proceeded to define the rele-
vant community more broadly than did the parties, it gave no
explanation as to why it did not accept the parties' views.
1 6
Some of the court's reasons may become evident in the follow-
ing analysis.
In defining the relevant community to include Palm Beach
and Dade Counties, in addition to Broward County, the court
cited several factors. Categorized generally, these factors
include the following: (1) common geography, including the
Atlantic coastline; (2) common tourism and immigration expo-
sure, including vacationers and retirees; (3) common transpor-
tation, including air, rail, and highways; (4) common markets,
including those for goods and employment; (5) common cul-
161. For example, the Skyywalker court stated, "obscenity is not a protected form
of speech under the U.S. Constitution.... It is a crime." Id. at 586.
162. For the Miller test, see supra text accompanying note 72.
163. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 587 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30,
reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973)).
164. Id.
165. Id (citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S 291, 303 (1977)).
166. Id. at 588.
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ture, including a distinct mix of ethnic peoples in each county;
(6) common political ties, including both legislative and judicial
boundaries; and (7) common media, including television, radio,
and newspapers. In addition, the court noted that its own
jurisdiction was broader than the three counties it chose, but
that the other counties in its jurisdiction did not have as signif-
icant ties to all three counties as they did to each other. 6 7
Whether examination of the first six factors-geography,
tourism, transportation, markets, culture, and politics-is capa-
ble of creating any actual distinctions between relevant and
nonrelevant communities is arguable. After all, depending on
the size of one's geographic, cultural, and political frames of
reference, such factors might be common to every county in
Florida, every state in the Union, or every community in the
Western Hemisphere. The problem with using such factors as
boundaries is that they are indeterminate absent a limiting
principle. The court did not specify a limiting principle.
What may be arguable in the court's first six factors is
clear for the seventh-the media. What is common to the mass
media of television, radio, and newspapers, among Palm Beach,
Dade, and Broward Counties, is common to those media among
every community in the United States. While these three com-
munities do possess "targeted" media,168 the court expressly
excluded those media from its analysis. Limited to the
national media, the messages carried by these media across the
country are largely homogeneous. Thus, at least for the media
factor, the court is defining the relevant community by a
national standard rather than by a community standard. Or
perhaps the court is attempting to account for the effects of
the national media on the development of the local commu-
nity's standards. If so, its choice of media is illuminating.
In limiting its choice of media, the court excluded books,
movies, and videotapes from its analysis of the effects of media
on the delineation of the relevant community. Each of these
media has an impact on the definition and reach of community
standards and, therefore, on the definition of the relevant com-
munity. One possible explanation for the court's omission of
these shared media may be that sexual discourse is more toler-
ated in those than on television and radio or in newspapers.
167. Id.
168. See id. Targeted media are those designed for a narrow and specific audience,
like a local newspaper.
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By considering the effects of these media within the commu-
nity, a court could be forced to apply a more tolerant commu-
nity standard. Another possible reason that the court did not
consider these media in its analysis will become clear in the
court's analysis of what constitutes the average person within
the relevant community.
Concluding that "the relevant community standard
reflects a more tolerant view of obscene speech than would
other communities within the state,"' 9 the court rejected the
Crew's argument that the average person in the community
was "'tolerant' per se."170 The Crew had pointed to the lack
of written complaints in the Nasty investigation file of the
Broward County Sheriff's Office as evidence that the average
Broward County resident was undisturbed by the recording.' 7 '
Even so, there were complaints in the file from other counties
such as Palm Beach and Dade.
Thus, one possible explanation for the court's somewhat
strained efforts to define the relevant community beyond the
confines of the activities of the Sheriff's Office may be that no
complaints from within Broward County existed. In order to
find that the average person in the community had objected to
Nasty, the court may simply have expanded the relevant com-
munity to include other "average persons." The court then
downplayed the importance of the lack of complaints from
Broward County by pointing to the complaints from the rest of
the relevant community.
172
The court also downplayed other arguably significant evi-
dence. The Crew submitted copies of books, movies, and video-
tapes that were available for purchase or rental in the local
community.173 The effects of these media on community per-
ceptions may be quite extensive. However, the court noted
that such materials need not be considered, even if comparable
works had been found nonobscene. 174 Further, the court stated
that "[e]vidence of depictions of sexual conduct in pictures,
moving or still, is not substantially equivalent to musical





174. Id. (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 126-27, reh'g denied, 414 U.S.
885 (1974)).
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lyrics. 1175 The court's choices of media and assertions as to
their qualities must now be examined more closely.
As already noted, three media that significantly affect
community perceptions of sexual norms through their perva-
sive presence were submitted to the court: books, movies, and
videotapes. With regard to books, American society may now
have reached the point that Justice Brennan hoped it had
reached in 1973. Justice Brennan, dissenting in a companion
case to Miller,176 suggested that "[s]urely we have passed the
point where the mere written description of sexual conduct is
deprived of first amendment protection.' 1 77 While attempts to
privately control dissemination of some books seem to continue
apace, 17  courts do not appear to be banning many books.
Indeed, works once banned by the courts, for example, those of
James Joyce,1 79 D. H. Lawrence," ° John Cleland,"8 Henry
Miller," 2 and the Marquis de Sade,'83 are now available in
local book stores and libraries. Such availability seems to lend
credence to Justice Brennan's views, if not vitality to his hopes.
Movies and videotapes also affect community perceptions
of what is acceptable. Recent movies and videos have broken
new ground in attempting to depict sexual acts without being
175. Id.
176. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
177. Id. at 100.
178. See DOYLE, supra note 41.
179. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 47.
181. See supra text accompanying note 66.
182. Henry Miller's TROPIC OF CANCER (1934) and TROPIC OF CAPRICORN (1939)
were both banned in the United States until 1961 because of their "frank" use of
language:
In the four hundred years since the last devouring soul appeared, the last man
to know the meaning of ecstasy, there has been a constant and steady decline
of man in art, in thought, in action. The world is pooped out: there isn't a dry
fart left. Who that has a desperate, hungry eye can have the slightest regard
for these existent governments, laws, codes, principles, ideals, ideas, totems,
and taboos? If anyone knew what it meant to read the riddle of that thing
which today is called a "crack" or a "hole," if any one had the least feeling of
mystery about the phenomena which are labeled "obscene," this world would
crack asunder.
HENRY MILLER, TROPIC OF CANCER 249 (1934). Miller died in 1980.
183. The copious works of the Marquis de Sade (1740-1814) are some of the most
vilified writings in history. Though a considerable body of writings is extant, the
larger part of his work appears to have been lost or destroyed. He spent 27 years of his
life in various prisons or asylums as a result of his many sexual offenses. Most of his
writings make Nasty seem nice by comparison. See, e.g., MARQUIS DE SADE, THE 120
DAYS OF SODOM AND OTHER WRITINGS (Austryn Wainhouse, Richard Seaver trans.,
Grove Weidenfeld 1966).
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branded X-rated. Other films have received an X-rating in
spite of their at least arguably serious artistic intent and execu-
tion. This has even led to the development of a new, interme-
diate rating standard: "NC-17." On the other hand, some films
seek out X-ratings and have even devised multiple-X ratings in
hopes of titillating potential customers. The value of an X-rat-
ing in some circles is very high.
The videotape's ability to bring such films into the home
may eventually have the greatest effect on average persons in
relevant communities. Since the Supreme Court's 1969 deci-
sion, Stanley v. Georgia,1  the Court has recognized the right
of individuals to possess sexually explicit materials within
their own homes. The burgeoning videotape industry has
given new meaning to this right. Triple-X rated videos are
available in many video rental stores around the country and
in corner convenience stores. Absorption is well under way.
As this limited review of the various impacts of books,
movies, and videotapes indicates, these media may have a large
impact on the beliefs of the local community. In choosing to
downplay evidence regarding these media in the community,
the Skyywalker court disregarded a matter of central impor-
tance to the determination of who average persons in the rele-
vant community are and what they believe is obscene. Failure
to consider the impact of these media may lead to distorted
judgments about the current beliefs of average persons in the
community.
Turning to the court's assertion that movies and pictures
of sex are "not substantially equivalent to musical lyrics," it
first appears that the court was self-contradictory on this point.
Later in the opinion, during its analysis of the prurient interest
element, the court also says that the "depictions of ultimate
sexual acts [on Nasty] are so vivid that they are hard to distin-
guish from seeing the same conduct described in the words of a
book, or in pictures in periodicals or films." '185
Pictures and films are either sufficiently equivalent to
lyrics to be helpful in determining the lyrics' obscenity, or they
are unequivalent and thus of no help. They cannot be both.
The court's non sequitur regarding the equivalence of pic-
184. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Of course, Stanley has subsequently been limited largely
to its facts by, inter alia, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, reh 'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039
(1986).
185. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 591.
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tures and lyrics is important because it may result from a fail-
ure to carefully consider the effects of the media. In contrast to
Judge Woolsey's careful and cohesive analysis in Ulysses,
wherein he draws illuminating parallels between various
media to clarify his analysis, Judge Gonzalez appears to be
avoiding such intermedia analyses. Some of the possible prag-
matic reasons for this avoidance have already been discussed.
The important point is that avoiding a careful examination of
the relationships among media, messages, and the observers of
those messages, may lead to self-contradictory conclusions by
the courts.
Having determined that average persons in relevant com-
munities are more tolerant than persons in other communities
in the state, the court turned to an application of the Miller
standards to the facts of the case. The court began its Miller
analysis with the prurient interest element.' Finding that
Nasty does appeal to the prurient interests of average persons
in the relevant communities, the court found "a clear intention
to lure hearers into" a variety of vividly described sexual
acts.8 7 For the court, this clear intention was manifest in the
repetitive nature of the descriptions and in the vividness of
those descriptions. Further, because the Crew testified that
"the Nasty recording was made to be listened and danced
to,' " and because "the 'rap' genre focuses upon verbal
messages accentuated by a strong beat,"' 8 9 the court found that
the words in the songs were the central focus of Nasty."9 As a
result, "the graphic deluge of sexual lyrics about nudity and
sexual conduct"'1 9' led the court to decide with "no difficulty
. . . that Nasty As They Wanna Be appeals to a shameful and
morbid interest in sex. '192
No purpose would be served by arguing with the court's
findings of fact on this or the other elements of the Miller
186. Id
187. Id. According to the court, the acts depicted on Nasty include: "references to
female and male genitalia, human sexual excretion, oral-anal contact, fellatio, group
sex, specific sexual positions, sadomasochism, the turgid state of the male sexual
organ, masturbation, cunnilingus, sexual intercourse." The court also strongly implied
that Nasty also depicted "deviate sexual intercourse . . . masturbation and
sadomasochistic abuse .. " Id. See infra note 240, for a sample of lyrics from Nasty.




192. Id at 592.
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standard. As the court noted in reference to the interpretation
of the musical aspects of Nasty, "reasonable persons could disa-
gree. 19 s However, it is of central importance to this Comment
to examine two of the court's premises regarding the prurient
appeal of Nasty as they relate to the medium of recorded
music.
The court's first premise, that "it does not significantly
alter the message of the Nasty recording to reduce it to a writ-
ten transcription, "194 is related to the serious value element of
the Miller test.1 95 The court's second premise is that depictions
of sexual conduct in any media are intended to lure observers
into such conduct.
Depictions of sexual conduct are not sexual conduct.196
Though the Skyywalker court explicitly found that "the evi-
dent goal of [Nasty] is to reproduce the sexual act through
musical lyrics,"'" such an interpretation of a musical perform-
ance is untenable. No rational person could hope to reproduce
a sexual act, or any other type of act, within a piece of music.
Indeed, the Crew itself testified that it created Nasty to be "lis-
tened and danced to."198
The origin of the court's untenable assertion regarding the
Crew's musical reproduction may be found in another of its
assertions: "it would be difficult, albeit not impossible, to find
that mere sound without lyrics is obscene."" While on its face
this assertion may wrinkle a few brows, the inclusion of the
concept of mere sound merits attention. The court did not say
"it would be difficult, albeit not impossible, to find that mere
music without lyrics is obscene." Such a statement would be
absurd because, considering the nonrational and nonexplicit
nature of music,2°° no rational person could find a particular
piece of music obscene under the Miller standards. Music
193. Id. at 591.
194. Id. at 595.
195. See infra notes 224-44 and accompanying text.
196. In American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985),
affl'd, 475 U.S. 1001, rehg denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986), the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals extensively noted the basic semantic distinction between depictions of the
thing and the thing itself. The court drew this distinction between pornographic
depictions of violence and sex on the one hand, and actual sadism on the other. The
distinction holds as well for distinctions between depictions of sexual acts and sex
itself.
197. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp at 591.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. Id (emphasis added).
200. Music is nonrational because it requires no linear analytical processes to
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alone cannot depict sexual matters so as to appeal to the pruri-
ent interest absent an undue imaginative exercise on the part
of the listener. Therefore, any assertion that a piece of purely
instrumental music could arouse "dirty" thoughts cannot be
logically supported.
Perhaps the court was aware of this logical impossibility
when it chose the term mere sound instead of mere music.
Sounds, such as utterances simulating those stimulated by sex-
ual arousal, could probably be found obscene. This is true
because such sounds are a product of the human voice and
because they are explicitly intended to simulate the actual act
of sexual moaning. A court could find that such sexually
explicit sounds were intended to appeal to the prurient
interest.20 1
Again, this may be the reason that the court chose the
term mere sound. If this is true, however, then the court used
its awareness of the distinctions between the media of sound
and music, and their different possible effects on listeners, to
obscure the issue of whether Nasty appeals to the prurient
interest. After all, the issue in Skyywalker is not sound but
music. Such obfuscation is counterproductive at best. Courts
should be aware of the effects of different media on the mater-
ials they are examining, but they should not use this awareness
to confuse the issues.
Turning next to the patently offensive conduct element,
the court also found that average persons in the relevant com-
munities would be patently offended by Nasty. Of interest are
two of the court's assertions regarding the effects of the
messages and their medium. First, the court likened Nasty's
descriptive lyrics "to a camera with a zoom lens, focusing on
the sights and sounds of various ultimate sex acts. ' 2 °2 Second,
perceive its nonexplicit messages. Such processes are used in understanding written
materials. People listen to music; they do not read it.
This is not to say that rational analysis cannot be applied to music; such an
analysis lies at the core of music theory. But such a rational analysis is not listening at
all. Though it increases listeners' appreciation for the craftsmanship of the composer,
it does not increase their understanding of the emotive or nonrational aspects of the
music's message. In effect, one cannot "hear" music's "other" messages at all unless
and until one stops analyzing it.
201. But cf., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985) (material
appealing to "normal, healthy, sexual desires" is not obscene). Thus, if such
"moaning" sounds were not depicted so as to arouse a lascivious reaction, but merely
to arouse the same healthy reaction such sounds would normally arouse, then they
arguably would not be obscene.
202. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 592.
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the court noted the "intrusive" nature of recorded music upon
unwilling listeners. 03
The court's analogy of Nasty's lyrics to a zoom camera
recalls Judge Woolsey's analogy of Joyce's literary technique to
the filmmaker's art.2" However, whereas Judge Woolsey
found that such comparisons illuminated the nature of Joyce's
artistic techniques and their relation to his depictions of a
"strong draught" of sexuality and excretory function, the
Skyywalker court finds only evidence of offensiveness in its
comparisons. On closer examination, such comparisons are
nevertheless appropriate. However, they are more complex
than the court's analysis would suggest.
Both music and pictures are nonrational media: 0 5 They
each are capable of conveying their messages without refer-
ence to rational forms of analysis or discourse. People look at
pictures. People listen to music. People do not normally ana-
lyze either, unless they are expressly trying to rationalize
them. Because they can and do convey messages in a nonratio-
nal format, the messages of both music and pictures are diffi-
cult to control, short of banning their distribution. However,
there is at least one relevant difference between them: while
pictures can convey explicit depictions of sex without any
accompanying text, music cannot.
This distinction between music and pictures brings us to
the court's second assertion, regarding the intrusiveness of
music. The court here notes that the presence of "dirty words"
on Nasty is not, by itself, sufficient to find the recording
patently offensive.2" While acknowledging that "the law does
require citizens to avert their ears when speech is merely
offensive," ' 7 the court next argues that citizens "do not have
an obligation to buy and use ear plugs in public."2 Arguing
further for the protection of the "unwilling listener,"2" the
court then makes the following statement: "Unlike a video
tape, a book, or a periodical, music must be played to be
203. Id. at 593.
204. See supra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 52, 63-64 and accompanying text (pictures are a nonrational
medium) and supra note 200 (music is a nonrational medium).
206. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 593 (citing American Bookseller's Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001, rehg denied, 475 U.S.
1132 (1986)); for a discussion of American Bookseller's, see supra note 196.
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experienced. 2 1 0
That books need not be "played" to be enjoyed is clear.
However, it is not true that they cannot be played. Many
books are now available on recorded cassettes for use by com-
muters, the blind, or other people who would just rather listen
to a book on the beach than read one. The court's assertion,
therefore, raises an interesting question. Could a book that
was otherwise not patently offensive, like Ulysses or An Amer-
ican Tragedy,211 become patently offensive simply by virtue of
its being recorded? Probably not.
But the issue thus posed does illuminate a weakness in the
court's analysis. It is incorrectly attributing patent offensive-
ness to a quality of the medium carrying the message, rather
than to the message itself. Specifically, the court attributes the
patent offensiveness of a given piece of music to the fact that it
may be played in public, which is a characteristic of the
medium of recorded music, rather than a characteristic of the
message.
The court's faulty attribution becomes all the more clear
in its related assertion that videotapes need not be played to be
enjoyed. The temptation to be facetious in the face of such an
assertion is overwhelming. Suffice it to say that little pleasure
is likely to be derived from "reading" a videotape, in public or
otherwise, whatever its contents. Perhaps this was an over-
sight on the part of the court.
Alternatively, it could be a symptom of a kind of media
blind-spot. In other words, because the court failed to distin-
guish between an attribute of the medium and the contents of
the message, it was blindsided by the two absurdities noted
here.21
2
To this point, the analysis of Skyywalker has revealed sev-
eral weaknesses in the court's reasoning that may be ascribed
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 47-48.
212. Marshall McLuhan has termed such media blindness "Narcissus-narcosis."
The essence of McLuhan's theory is that, because media are extensions of our senses,
and because such extensions cause an extreme sense of dislocation in our minds, we
have a tendency to block out the effects of the media. See supra note 97. In the
instant case, the implication is that the court could not see the contradiction of finding
that an attribute of the medium that affects all the messages carried on it, whether
sexual or not, could contribute to the patent offensiveness of a particular sexual
message that might be played on it. In fact, if McLuhan is correct, the court might not
recognize the contradictory nature of its finding even after it was explained. See
generally, McLuHAN & FIoRE, supra note 97, at 51-63.
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to a lack of understanding of the effects of media. First, by
including national media in its determination of the relevant
community and excluding local ones, the court may hasten the
absorption of the Miller test. Second, by excluding books,
movies, and videotapes from its analysis of media effects on
local community standards, the court may develop a skewed
perception of those standards. Third, by avoiding careful con-
sideration of the effects of the media on messages, the court
may develop contradictory reasoning processes and fail to cor-
rectly determine whether a given message is obscene. Fourth,
by failing to explicitly state its assumptions regarding the
effects of the media in question, the court may subvert the
legal process' attempts to control obscenity, or it may be blind-
sided by the media's effects on messages, thereby arriving at
untenable positions regarding those effects.
Finally, the court addressed the serious value element of
the Miller test: "whether the Nasty recording, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value" as judged by a reasonable person.213 To begin, the court
explained that this case is not about (1) the rap or hip-hop
genres of music; (2) the Crew itself, as a band; (3) the Crew
members themselves, as individuals; (4) the Crew's other
music; nor (5) whether the Nasty recording is "stylish," "taste-
ful," and "popular. 2 14 The court is only interested in whether
Nasty is obscene. Striking a somewhat defensive tone, how-
ever, the court wrote "[t]he Phillistines [sic] are not always
wrong, nor are the guardians of the First Amendment always
right."2
1 5
The court next examined whether Nasty might have any
political or scientific value. Professor Carlton Long, a qualified
expert in African-American culture, testified that Nasty does
have political and scientific value. Two of Professor Long's
explanations may be generally characterized as follows:
(1) Nasty is an expression of the experiences and perceptions
of young African-American men in the late twentieth century
and, as such, it is an inherently political statement about the
conditions of life for these men; and (2) Nasty contains exam-
ples of expressive modalities of African-American oral
213. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp at 593.
214. Id at 594.
215. Id.
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culture. 16
The court dismissed Professor Long's first point, that
expressions of the life experiences of African-American men
are inherently political, by saying that "[w]hile it is doubtless
true that Nasty is a product of the group's background . . .
[and] heritage as black Americans, this fact does not convert
whatever they say, or sing, into political speech." '17 But the
Crew did not seek to "convert" their speech. In fact, the
Crew's members testified that Nasty is not intended to convey
a political message. Conversion is not the issue. The issue is
whether the angry and misogynistic expressions on Nasty are
political expressions worthy of First Amendment protection.
However, further analysis of this issue is outside the scope of
the present inquiry.
Turning to Professor Long's second point, that Nasty uses
elements of African-American oral tradition that are signifi-
cant from both political and scientific standpoints, the court
found "none of these arguments persuasive. "218 These argu-
ments consisted of testimony by Professor Long on the oral
traditions of "call and response," "doing the dozens," and
"boasting. '21 Professor Long testified that such examples of
the street culture of African-American youths have significant
sociological value. 220 In addition, Long testified that examples
of literary techniques such as rhyme, allusion, and personifica-
tion were present on Nasty.2 21
In dismissing these points, the court first noted that the
examples of call and response on Nasty consisted of "males
and females yell[ing], in repetitive verse, 'Tastes Great-Less
Filling' and, in another song, assail campus Greek-letter group
[sic]." 222  The court then noted that the other examples of
African-American oral traditions, while perhaps present in
greater quantities than call and response, "are also found in
other cultures. '223  Finally, in response to Professor Long's
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stated that "[t]his, of course, is nonsense." 2' In sum, the court
found by a preponderance of the evidence, and even by clear
and convincing evidence, that a reasonable person could not
find Nasty to have serious political or scientific value.
It is illuminating, from a media ecology perspective, that
the court strikes a somewhat strident tone throughout its
examination of the political and scientific value of the evidence
concerning the oral traditions of African-American culture.
The court's apologetic listing of groups and individuals that it
does not wish to offend, its defensive Philistine remark, and its
characterization of Professor Long's testimony as "argument"
and "nonsense" appear to manifest a latent hostility toward
Nasty.
Such hostility, if it is present, may have its unconscious
origins in the larger clash between the oral and literate cul-
tures,225 of which Skyywalker is a modern microcosm. This
clash between the oral and literate cultures has been studied
by many media ecologists.2 26 According to Father Walter J.
Ong, perhaps the foremost expert on the distinctions and con-
flicts between orality and literacy, the clash between an oral
culture and a literate one is inherent in the nature of the liter-
ate mind.227
Simply put, this clash originates with the process of learn-
ing to write in a literate culture, which restructures human
consciousness so as to exclude and devalue previous, oral
modes of thought.22s Through the development of writing, and
later, printing, the law developed its bias in favor of rational
discourse and against nonrational, nonliterate discourse.229
While a detailed account of the differences between an
oral culture and a literate one is outside the scope of this Com-
224. Id at 595. The court went on to quote the famous dictum from Kois v.
Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972): "A quotation from Voltaire in the fly leaf of a
book will not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication."
225. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to give a detailed account of the
effects on the law of the clash, or process of change, from a primarily oral culture, to a
primarily literate one and beyond. Fortunately, such an examination has already been
made and is the subject of Professors Collins and Skover's Paratexts, supra note 2.
226. See e.g., INNIS, supra note 24; MCLUHAN, GALAxY, supra note 24, and
McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA, supra note 64; ONG, supra note 24 (1982); Eluc
HAVELOCK, THE MUSE LEARNS To WRITE (1986); Collins and Skover, Paratexts, supra
note 2.
227. See generally ONG, supra note 24.
228. Id. at 78-123.
229. Collins & Skover, Paratexts, supra note 2, at 26-54.
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ment, some examination of the attributes of the oral mind20 or
more appropriately, the secondary oral mind,23 ' in relation to
the serious value evidence in Skyywalker may clarify the
nature of the conflict between the orality of Nasty and the lit-
eracy of the law.
As noted above, the Crew introduced testimony that Nasty
contains examples of African-American oral traditions in the
form of doing the dozens, boasting, and call and response.232
Father Ong has carefully examined these forms of oral dis-
course and the literate mind's reactions to them.233 The appli-
cation of a few of his insights in relation to the expert
testimony of Professor Long will disclose weaknesses in the
court's analysis.
The court's first objection to Professor Long's testimony
was that the alleged call and response aspects of Nasty were
apparently "lifted from a beer commercial." 2" But the use of
aspects of the culture's common experience is a hallmark of
expression in oral traditions. That the Crew recognizes the
call and response patterns present on the television and repli-
cates them in its music shows its awareness of the "real life"
experiences of its intended audience. In asserting that "[t]he
230. The "oral mind" is simply one that has not been restructured by learning to
write. ONG, supra note 24, at 10-15.
231. Id. Father Ong has stated that truly oral minds no longer exist because all
cultures have been exposed, to some extent, to the effects of writing. But Ong and
others have identified a newly emergent consciousness which he calls "secondary
orality." This secondary orality is a hybrid of the oral mind and the literate mind,
brought about by the extension of the senses through electronic media discussed
above. See supra note 97. In essence, because these media allow us to communicate
and interact orally and from a distance, thereby extending the reach of our senses, a
secondary phase of predominantly oral discourse, secondary orality, has begun to
develop. While this new orality will not likely displace literacy, it has distinctly
limited the once dominant value of literacy in modern society.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 219-24.
233. ONG, supra note 24, at 31-57. Of particular interest among Father Ong's
analyses of the traits of individuals in oral societies are the following. (1) Because oral
societies must rely on memory rather than written records, mnemonic devices such as
rhyme, rhythm, and alliteration are used extensively; (2) because oral societies must
rely on repetition rather than "backlooping" in a text (i.e., quickly glancing back to the
beginning of a line or page for recall), redundancy is essential for both remembering
and explaining;, and (3) because oral societies must rely on knowledge gained and
stored in terms of their daily struggles for existence, rather than abstractly
conceptualizing possible outcomes, agonistic expressions (i.e., combative expressions)
and "real life" expressions are prevalent in their discourse. Each of these concepts
will become clearer through an examination of their relationship to the court's
analyses of the serious value element in the text.
234. Skyywalker v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 594 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
466 University of Puget Sound Law Review
phrases alone have no significant artistic merit nor are they
examples of black American culture,"2" the court addresses
neither the meaning of artistic merit in the context of a secon-
dary oral culture, nor the realities of African-American
culture.
The court's second objection to Professor Long's testimony
was that his examples of African-American oral traditions "are
found in other cultures."2 This is certainly true. But if the
court is sincere in attempting to discover whether Nasty has
any scientific value, then its recognition of the cross-cultural
significance of such expressive modes should argue in favor of
finding serious value in Nasty, not against it.
More specifically, "running the dozens" is "[s]tandard in
oral societies across the world [and its] reciprocal name-calling
has been fitted with a specific name in linguistics: flyting.
' '2 7
Thus, the universality among oral cultures of this flyting activ-
ity, which the court takes to invalidate its sociological signifi-
cance, actually is itself sociologically significant. The court
fails to recognize this significance because it is not examining
the medium of discourse, but only its surface message.
The court's third objection to Professor Long's testimony
was that it is nonsense to assert that the presence of certain lit-
erary devices on Nasty could give it serious political or scien-
tific value.' But evidence of the use of literary devices
signifying traditional oral discourse in the form of rhyme,
rhythm, and alliteration, is probative on the nature of such
expressions.
For instance, the expression of pent-up emotions created
by constant exposure to difficult living conditions is fundamen-
tal to such traditional oral discourse and may be socially
cathartic. Therefore, the court should at least have examined
more closely the evidence regarding the oral mode of discourse
and its possibly serious political and scientific value.
Turning from political and scientific value, the court then
addressed the question of serious artistic value. The Crew first
argued that Nasty was comedic and satirical art.23 9 The court
was not amused: "[ilt cannot be reasonably argued that the
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. ONG, supra note 24, at 44.
238. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 595.
239. Id.
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violence, perversion, abuse of women, graphic depictions of all
forms of sexual conduct, and miscroscopic [sic] descriptions of
human genitalia [sic] contained on this recording are comedic
art. 2 40  According to Father Ong's theories, had the court
examined the nature of oral expression more closely, it might
have found more to laugh about on Nasty.
As Father Ong has noted, "the Dozens is not a real fight,
but an art form, as are the other stylized verbal tongue lash-
ings in other cultures."" Such stylized verbal abuse inevitably
is aimed at a "sister, but ultimately, [a] mother."'  Further-
more, "[e]nthusiastic description of physical violence often
marks oral narrative." 3 This is because "violence in oral art
forms is ... connected with the structure of orality itself."2'
Thus, the real world tensions of day-to-day life will find
expression and release in a nonviolent verbal purging of anger
within the oral art form. This purging acts on both the
speaker and the listener.
In light of these analyses, the agonistic and violent expres-
sions on Nasty would seem to have social value as artistic
expression, as well as political value as a kind of pressure
release valve. Furthermore, the misogynistic expressions
noted by the court would appear to be part of the "stylized ver-
bal tongue lashings" common in oral modes of expression.
These expressions also reflect the real world tensions of every
day life for Nasty's audience. The court, however, does not rec-
ognize the possibility of the artistic and political value of Nasty
because it only analyzes the apparent message in its words.
The deeper message is in the form of the communication.
240. Id. A representative sample of the expressions the court was objecting to
includes the following- (Rap over drums and music):
Dick Almighty (repeat several times)/ Dickta Almighty's of no surprise/ It'll
fuck all the bitches/ All shapes and sizes/ She'll climb a mountain/ Even run
the block/ Just to kiss the head/ Of this big black cock/ It'll tear the pussy
open/ Cause it's satisfaction/ The bitch won't leave/ It's fatal attraction/
Dick's so powerful/ She'll kneel and pray/ Awaiting her time/ Hoping soon to
slay .. ./ That Dick/ Will make a bitch act cute/ Suck my dick bitch/ And
make it puke/ Jump up on it/ Grab it like you want it/ If you could wear a
dick bitch/ You would flaunt it/ That Dick Almighty,/ A-A-All-mighty ....
241. ONG, supra note 24, at 44 (emphasis added).
242. Carlton Long, The Oral Tradition, N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1990, at 29.
243. ONG, supra note 24, at 44.
244. Id. at 45.
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V. CONCLUSION
Courts must begin to examine the relationships between
the media and messages they carry if they are to recognize the
kind of paradoxical and destructive powers that the media con-
tain. Careful judicial analysis of these relationships might, for
a time, result in more enlightened and effective regulation of
sexually explicit materials if courts no longer incorrectly attri-
bute qualities of media to messages they carry.
As a result, courts may attempt to regulate the media
themselves, within the framework of traditionally accepted
"time, place, and manner" regulations. They may also abandon
tacit presumptions of harmfulness that contribute only confu-
sion and contradiction to current theory. Such band-aids might
forestall highly dangerous attempts to restrict First Amend-
ment freedoms in the name of preventing the debasement of
the First Amendment by modern media.
However, if the absorption thesis and the Paratrooper's
Paradox ultimately prove true in their most extreme manifes-
tations, little can be done to prevent the debasement of dis-
course through the process of derationalization inherent in the
modern media. No rationalistic course of preventive medicine
can rid the postmodern society of this continually intensifying
derationalization. "Don't attempt to adjust your TV, you are
no longer in control .... "
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